Communication publiée dans un ouvrage (Colloques, congrès, conférences scientifiques et actes)
“You Shall Not Abstain!” A Formal Study of Forced Participation
JAMROGA, Wojciech; ROENNE, Peter; KIM, Yanet al.
2024 • In Budurushi, Jurlind (Ed.) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2024 International Workshops - Voting, DeFI, WTSC, CoDecFin, Revised Selected Papers
[en] In this paper we revisit the idea of participation privacy in secure voting, i.e., when public data does not reveal whether a given voter participated in the election. This is an important property, especially when defining coercion-resistance preventing forced abstention attacks, and it is frequently mentioned as one of the main necessary conditions. However, what has been largely overlooked in the secure voting literature, is the idea of preventing forced participation attacks, i.e., where a voter is forced, or more subtly feels forced, to participate in an election. Whereas a high participation rate might seem like a desirable democratic property, there are cases when a part of the society wants to boycott the vote, e.g., in order to express its disapproval, or to prevent the proposed legislation. We logically formalise the idea of resistance to forced participation and, perhaps surprisingly, show that it is to some extent dual to forced abstention resistance. We also give intuitive examples of systems that satisfy one, but not the other.
Disciplines :
Sciences informatiques
Auteur, co-auteur :
JAMROGA, Wojciech ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust > APSIA > Team Peter RYAN ; Institute of Computer Science, Polish Academy of Science, Warsaw, Poland
ROENNE, Peter ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > APSIA
KIM, Yan ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > APSIA
RYAN, Peter Y A ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Medicine (FSTM) > Department of Computer Science (DCS)
Co-auteurs externes :
yes
Langue du document :
Anglais
Titre :
“You Shall Not Abstain!” A Formal Study of Forced Participation
Date de publication/diffusion :
30 novembre 2024
Nom de la manifestation :
9th Workshop on Advances in Secure Electronic Voting Schemes (Voting 2024)
Lieu de la manifestation :
Willemstad, Curaçao
Date de la manifestation :
08-03-2024 => 08-03-2024
Titre de l'ouvrage principal :
Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2024 International Workshops - Voting, DeFI, WTSC, CoDecFin, Revised Selected Papers
Editeur scientifique :
Budurushi, Jurlind
Maison d'édition :
Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
This research has been supported by NCBR Poland and FNR Luxembourg under the PolLux/FNR-CORE project SpaceVote (POLLUX-XI/14/SpaceVote/2023 and C22/IS/17232062/SpaceVote) and the FNR-CORE project PABLO (C21/IS/16326754/PABLO). For the purpose of open access, and in fulfilment of the obligations arising from the grant agreement, the authors have applied CC BY 4.0 license to any Author Accepted Manuscript version arising from this submission.
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