[en] We present a new verifiable voting scheme based on the Hyperion scheme but providing everlasting privacy and receipt-freeness. As with Selene and Hyperion, it provides a direct form of E2E verifiability: voters verify the presence of their votes in plaintext in the tally. However, in contrast to Selene or Hyperion, the privacy of this protocol is everlasting. In addition, our protocol offers the novel feature of everlasting receipt-freeness and coercion mitigation.
Disciplines :
Computer science
Author, co-author :
MOSAHEB, Rafieh ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > APSIA
ROENNE, Peter ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > APSIA
RYAN, Peter Y A ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Medicine (FSTM) > Department of Computer Science (DCS)
Sarfaraz, Sara; University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Canada
External co-authors :
yes
Language :
English
Title :
Direct and Transparent Voter Verification with Everlasting Receipt-Freeness
Publication date :
2025
Event name :
E-VOTE-ID International Conference
Event place :
Tarragona, Esp
Event date :
02-10-2024 => 04-10-2024
Audience :
International
Main work title :
Electronic Voting - 9th International Joint Conference, E-Vote-ID 2024, Proceedings
Editor :
Duenas-Cid, David
Publisher :
Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
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