Article (Scientific journals)
Piracy and Competition
Belleflamme, Paul; Picard, Pierre M
2007In Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 16 (2), p. 351-383
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Abstract :
[en] The effects of (private, small-scale) piracy on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model of vertical differentiation. Although information goods are assumed to be perfectly differentiated, demands are interdependent because the copying technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. We characterize the Bertrand-Nash equilibria in a duopoly. Comparing equilibrium prices to the prices set by a multiproduct monopolist, we show that competition drives prices up and may lead to price dispersion. Competition reduces total surplus in the short run but provides higher incentives to create in the long run.
Disciplines :
Economic systems & public economics
Author, co-author :
Belleflamme, Paul;  Center for Operations Research and Econometrics - CORE ; Université Catholique de Louvain - UCL
Picard, Pierre M ;  University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA)
External co-authors :
yes
Language :
English
Title :
Piracy and Competition
Publication date :
2007
Journal title :
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
ISSN :
1530-9134
Publisher :
Blackwell Publishing
Volume :
16
Issue :
2
Pages :
351-383
Peer reviewed :
Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi
Available on ORBilu :
since 14 March 2016

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