Paper published in a book (Scientific congresses, symposiums and conference proceedings)
Voting Without Self-voting
ROENNE, Peter
2025 • In Haslhofer, Bernhard (Ed.) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2025 International Workshops - CoDecFin, FinTeAchin, VOTING, 2025, Revised Selected Papers
Decentralised; E-Voting; Small scale; Voting systems
Abstract :
[en] In an election, self-voting, i.e. candidates voting for themselves or their own proposals, might only capture an obvious inclination or a fear of loss of reputation, and hence may not be useful towards choosing the best candidate. In some contexts, e.g. for small scale boardroom elections, it can thus be sensible to prohibit self-voting, especially, this will prevent everybody pointing to themselves as the best choice. In the case of public elections this is easy to enforce, however, in standard secret ballot elections the no-self-voting condition is unchecked and relies on the honesty of the participants. More commonly, the constraint is simply not imposed in the first place due to lack of enforcement. A generalisation is where certain groups are not allowed to vote for their own candidate. In this case, preventing self-voting can also reduce the level of coercion, e.g., if team leaders demand, or more subtly simply expect, all their team members to vote for them in an election for the best team leader. With the aid of secure e-voting, imposing the no-self-voting constraint becomes possible. We show how this constraint can be implemented efficiently, in the context of both centralised and decentralised voting. Especially, we show how to obtain a robust (i.e. allowing absentees) decentralised voting system preventing self-voting by using just standard linkable ring signatures and anonymous vote-casting channels.
Disciplines :
Computer science
Author, co-author :
ROENNE, Peter ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > APSIA
External co-authors :
no
Language :
English
Title :
Voting Without Self-voting
Publication date :
2025
Event name :
10th Workshop on Advances in Secure Electronic Voting Schemes at Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Event place :
Miyakojima, Japan
Event date :
18-04-2025 => 18-04-2025
Audience :
International
Main work title :
Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2025 International Workshops - CoDecFin, FinTeAchin, VOTING, 2025, Revised Selected Papers
Editor :
Haslhofer, Bernhard
Publisher :
Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
FNR16221219 - ImPAKT - Real-world Implementation And Human-centered Design Of Pake Technologies, 2021 (01/06/2022-31/05/2025) - Peter Y. A. Ryan
Funding text :
This research was funded in part by the Luxembourg National Research Fund (FNR), grant reference C21/IS/16221219/ImPAKT. For the purpose of open access, and in fulfilment of the obligations arising from the grant agreement, the author has applied a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license to any Author Accepted Manuscript version arising from this submission.
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