RALEIGH, Thomas ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences (FHSE) > Department of Humanities (DHUM) > Philosophy
Astore, R. (2016). ‘Nagarjuna’s Idealism as a Metaphysical Justification Against Ignorance’. Inquiries Journal [Online] 8(6). http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=1426
J.L. Austin A plea for excuses Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57 1 30 10.1093/aristotelian/57.1.1
M. Blome-Tilman Gradability and Knowledge The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism Routledge
Brogaard, B. (2016). Ignorance and incompetence: Linguistic considerations. In Peels, & Blaauw (Eds.), The epistemic dimensions of ignorance, Cambridge University Press. 57–80.
L. Buchak Belief, credence, and norms Philosophical Studies 169 2 285 311 10.1007/s11098-013-0182-y
R. Ciuni G. Tuzet Inevitable ignorance as a standard for excusability: An epistemological analysis Synthese 198 5047 5066 10.1007/s11229-019-02388-2
T. Crane Tye on acquaintance and the problem of consciousness Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8 1 190 198 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00557.x
M. Deutsch The Myth of the Intuitive: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method MIT Press 10.7551/mitpress/9780262028950.001.0001
K. Dorst Lockeans maximize expected accuracy Mind 128 509 175 211 10.1093/mind/fzx028
Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper.
F. Dretske The pragmatic dimension of knowledge Philosophical Studies 40 3 363 378 10.1007/BF00646423
N. El Kassar What ignorance really is. Examining the foundations of epistemology of ignorance Social Epistemology 32 5 300 310 10.1080/02691728.2018.1518498
L. Fields Moral beliefs and blameworthiness Philosophy 69 4 397 415 10.1017/S0031819100047239
Frank, A. (2012). ‘How Uncertain was Heisenberg?’, National Public Radio (NPR) blog Cosmos & Culture. https://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2012/06/05/154282317/how-uncertain-was-heisenberg
A. Goldman Epistemology and Cognition Harvard University Press
A. Goldman E. Olsson A. Haddock A. Millar D. Pritchard Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge Epistemic Value Oxford University Press
A. Guerrero Don’t know, don’t kill: Moral ignorance, culpability, and caution Philosophical Studies 136 1 59 97 10.1007/s11098-007-9143-7
S. Haack The Ethics of Belief Reconsidered Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue Oxford University Press
J. Hawthorne F. Huber C. Schmidt-Petri The Lockean thesis and the logic of belief Degrees of belief: An anthology Oxford University Press
A. Hazlett Factive presupposition and the truth condition on knowledge Acta Analytica 27 461 478 10.1007/s12136-012-0163-3
S. Hetherington Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge: On Two Dogmas of Epistemology Oxford University Press 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247349.001.0001
E. Jackson Belief and credence: Why the attitude-type matters Philosophical Studies 176 2477 2496 10.1007/s11098-018-1136-1
H. Kornblith Knowledge and its Place in Nature Oxford University Press 10.1093/0199246319.001.0001
H. Kornblith A Naturalistic Epistemology: Selected Papers Oxford University Press 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712459.001.0001
B. Kyle Truth and ignorance Synthese 198 8 7739 7762 10.1007/s11229-020-02546-x
E. Laurence S. Margolis ‘Should we trust our intuitions? Deflationary accounts of the analytic data’ Proceedings Of The Aristotelian Society 103 3 299 323 10.1111/1467-9264.00138
Le Morvan, P. (2011). On ignorance: A reply to peels. Philosophia, 39, 335–344.
P. Le Morvan On ignorance: A vindication of the standard view Philosophia 40 379 393 10.1007/s11406-011-9330-9
P. Le Morvan Why the standard view of ignorance prevails Philosophia 41 239 256 10.1007/s11406-013-9417-6
P. Le Morvan On the ignorance, knowledge, and nature of propositions Synthese 192 11 3647 3662 10.1007/s11229-015-0712-6
P. Le Morvan Ignorance, knowledge, and two epistemic intuitions Philosophia 49 2123 2132 10.1007/s11406-021-00342-6
P. Le Morvan Ignorance, truth, and falsehood Ratio 35 3 169 180 10.1111/rati.12341
H. Leitgeb Reducing belief simpliciter to degrees of belief Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 1338 1389 10.1016/j.apal.2013.06.015
C. Littlejohn Who cares about what you accurately believe? Philosophical Perspectives 29 217 248 10.1111/phpe.12064
E. Lord The Importance of Being Rational Oxford University Press 10.1093/oso/9780198815099.001.0001
A. Meylan Ignorance and its disvalue Grazer Philosophische Studien 97 3 433 447 10.1163/18756735-000106
A. Meylan In defence of the normative account of ignorance Erkenntnis 89 207 221 10.1007/s10670-022-00529-7
A. Moon Beliefs do not come in degrees Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 6 1 19 10.1080/00455091.2017.1320201
C. Pavese Know-how and gradability Philosophical Review 126 3 345 383 10.1215/00318108-3878493
R. Peels What is ignorance? Philosophia 38 1 57 67 10.1007/s11406-009-9202-8
R. Peels Ignorance is lack of true belief: A rejoinder to Le Morvan Philosophia 39 2 344 355 10.1007/s11406-010-9301-6
R. Peels The new view on ignorance undefeated Philosophia 40 4 741 750 10.1007/s11406-012-9364-7
R. Peels Ignorance: A Philosophical Study Oxford University Press 10.1093/oso/9780197654514.001.0001
Peels, R., & Blaauw, M. (Eds.). (2016). The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance. Cambridge University Press.
D. Pritchard Ignorance and inquiry American Philosophical Quarterly 58 2 111 124 10.2307/48613999
D. Pritchard Ignorance and normativity Philosophical Topics 49 2 225 243 10.5840/philtopics202149223
F.P. Ramsey R.B. Braithwaite General Propositions and Causality The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays Kegan Paul
N. Rescher Ignorance: On the Wider Implications of Deficient Knowledge University of Pittsburgh 10.2307/j.ctt6wrb89
Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of Mind. Hutchinson & Co.
Sethna, J. (2006). [2021]) Statistical Mechanics: Entropy, Order Parameters and Complexity, [2nd edition] Oxford University Press.
P. Silva W. Siscoe ‘Ignorance and awareness’ Noûs 58 1 225 243 10.1111/nous.12450
P. Silva W. Siscoe Awareness by degree Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 110 1 172 200 10.1111/phpr.13090
W. Siscoe Knowledge, true belief, and the gradability of ignorance Philosophical Studies 181 4 893 916 10.1007/s11098-024-02119-5
D. Smithies The normative role of knowledge Noûs 46 2 265 288 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00787.x
J. Stanley Knowledge and Practical Interests Oxford University Press 10.1093/0199288038.001.0001
J. Stanley Know How Oxford University Press 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695362.001.0001
P. Unger Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism Clarendon
R. Van Woudenberg Ignorance and force: Two excusing conditions for false beliefs American Philosophical Quarterly 46 4 373 386
K. Vogt Belief and Truth Oxford University Press 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199916818.001.0001
N. Weinberg Stich Normativity and epistemic intuitions’ Philosophical Topics 29 1–2 429 460 10.5840/philtopics2001291/217
T. Williamson The Philosophy of Philosophy Wiley-Blackwell 10.1002/9780470696675
M.J. Zimmerman An Essay on Moral Responsibility Rowman and Littlefield
