![]() | RALEIGH, T., & KNOKS, A. (07 October 2025). Clarifying the Opacity of Neural Networks. Minds and Machines, 35 (4). doi:10.1007/s11023-025-09745-w Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
![]() | RALEIGH, T. (2025). Two or Three Strands To the Concept of Ignorance. Erkenntnis. doi:10.1007/s10670-025-01021-8 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
![]() | RALEIGH, T.*. (2025). What can we know about unanswerable questions? Philosophical Quarterly, 75 (1), 213-227. doi:10.1093/pq/pqad109 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
![]() | RALEIGH, T. (2025). 'On Being Debased'. Philosophical Studies. doi:10.1007/s11098-025-02352-6 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
![]() | RALEIGH, T., & LOGUE, H. (2025). What Can the Naïve Realist Say about Total Hallucinations? Riding the New Relationalist Wave. In The Relational View of Perception: New Philosophical Essays. Routledge. Peer reviewed |
![]() | RALEIGH, T., & MEYLAN, A. (2025). Normative relations between ignorance and suspension of judgement: a systematic investigation. In Suspension in Epistemology and Beyond. Routledge. Peer reviewed |
![]() | RALEIGH, T. (2024). Familiar Properties and Phenomenal Properties. Analytic Philosophy, 65 (2), 274-300. doi:10.1111/phib.12285 Peer reviewed |
![]() | RALEIGH, T. (2024). The Emptiness of Naturalism Joint Winner of the <i>Philosophy</i> Essay Prize Competition 2023. Philosophy, 99 (4), 597-623. doi:10.1017/S0031819124000172 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
![]() | RALEIGH, T. (2023). The argument from small improvement is a red herring. Inquiry. doi:10.1080/0020174X.2023.2205441 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
![]() | RALEIGH, T. (November 2022). Perceptual Content, Phenomenal Contrasts, and Externalism. Journal of Philosophy, 119 (11), 602-627. doi:10.5840/jphil20221191139 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
![]() | RALEIGH, T. (25 March 2022). Comments on Smithies. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 1 (13). doi:10.1007/s44204-022-00016-4 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
![]() | RALEIGH, T. (2022). Philosophy of Perception & Liberal Naturalism. In D. Macarthur & M. De Caro (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Liberal Naturalism. Routledge. Peer reviewed |
![]() | KNOKS, A., & RALEIGH, T. (2022). XAI and philosophical work on explanation: A roadmap. Proceedings of 1st Workshop on Bias, Ethical AI, Explainability and the Role of Logic and Logic Programming, 3319, 101-106. Peer reviewed |
![]() | RALEIGH, T., & Vindrola, F. (2021). Perceptual Experience and Degrees of Belief. Philosophical Quarterly, 71 (2), 378-406. doi:10.1093/pq/pqaa047 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
![]() | RALEIGH, T. (2021). Suspending is Believing. Synthese, 198, 2449-2474. doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02223-8 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
![]() | RALEIGH, T. (2021). Visual Acquaintance, Action and the Explanatory Gap. Synthese, 198, 4081-4106. doi:10.1007/s11229-018-01907-x Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
![]() | RALEIGH, T. (2021). A New Anti-Expertise Dilemma. Synthese, 199, 5551-5569. doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03035-5 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
![]() | RALEIGH, T. (2020). Science, Substance and Spatial Appearances. Philosophical Studies. doi:10.1007/s11098-019-01300-5 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
![]() | RALEIGH, T. (2020). Plenty of room left for the Dogmatist. Analysis. doi:10.1093/analys/anz035 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |