Climate-Based Judicial Review and Liberal Democracy: Towards a New Understanding of the Separation of Powers?

Climate protection lawsuits are being filed in court dockets worldwide. In particular, young people demand that the judicial branch provide declaratory and injunctive relief in complex climate-based judicial review petitions, thereby placing the courts in a difficult situation. Climate protection entails a profound restructuring of socioeconomic life and interest balancing, which is not for the courts to decide. The judicial, as the third branch of government, has no power over the purse or the sword of the state. What should courts do?
On the one hand, courts should refrain from making counter-majoritarian decisions, adhering to the separation of powers and the ideal of self-government through the people's laws. On the other hand, they should hold political representatives accountable because the rival ideal of government bound by law limits political discretion and imposes duties upon courts. Courts taking the lead in climate protection raise counter-majoritarian difficulties.
This thesis, drawing on the work of John Rawls, Frank Michelman, and Mark Tushnet, aims to develop a climate-based judicial review framework that considers both ideals and mitigates counter-majoritarian threats. It should promote the respectworthiness of the democratic project and the cooperation between the branches of government.