'On Being Debased'

RALEIGH, Thomas

doi:10.1007/s11098-025-02352-6

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'On Being Debased'

RALEIGH, Thomas

2025 • In Philosophical Studies

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https://hdl.handle.net/10993/65075

DOI
10.1007/s11098-025-02352-6

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Keywords :

Epistemology; Skepticism; The basing relation; Rationality

Abstract :

[en] A standard form of skeptical scenario, in the tradition of Descartes' evil demon, raises the prospect that our sensory experiences are deceptive. A less familiar and importantly different kind of skeptical scenario raises the prospect that our beliefs have been debased (Schaffer, 2010). This paper provides a new and improved way of resisting this latter kind of debasing skepticism. Along the way, I explore how the debasing demon scenario connects with some potentially controversial epistemological principles and clear up various neglected or misunderstood points concerning debasing skepticism.

Disciplines :

Philosophy & ethics

Author, co-author :

RALEIGH, Thomas ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences (FHSE) > Department of Humanities (DHUM) > Philosophy ; University ; University

External co-authors :

Language :

English

Title :

'On Being Debased'

Publication date :

2025

Journal title :

Philosophical Studies

ISSN :

0031-8116

Publisher :

Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands

Peer reviewed :

Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi

Available on ORBilu :

since 26 May 2025

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