Abstract :
[en] We investigate the presence of inefficiency in slot allocation when an airport allocates slots in destination markets served by monopoly and duopoly airlines, with the number of available peak-time slots constrained by airport capacity. When an airport maintains regulated per-passenger fees, we observe the emergence of allocative inefficiency. Conversely, in scenarios where an airport has the autonomy to set fees, we find that, in line with empirical evidence, fee liberalization resolves these allocative inefficiencies by increasing per-passenger fees. However, the improvement in allocation efficiency may be counterbalanced by the rise in fees, potentially impacting overall welfare.
Funding text :
P.M. Picard was funded in part by the TSPQ C20/SC/14755507 and Inter/Mobility/2021/LE/16527808 of the Fonds National de la Recherche of Luxembourg. X. Wan was funded by the Social Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province, China (No. 22EYD005).
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