[en] Coercion and vote-buying are challenging and multi-faceted threats that prevent people from expressing their will freely. Even though there are known techniques to resist or partially mitigate coercion and vote-buying, we explicitly demonstrate that they generally underestimate the power of malicious actors by not accounting for current technological tools that could support coercion and vote-selling. In this paper, we give several examples of how a coercer can force voters to comply with his demands or how voters can prove how they voted. To do so, we use tools like blockchains, delay encryption, privacy-preserving smart contracts, or trusted hardware. Since some of the successful coercion attacks occur on voting schemes that were supposed/claimed/proven to be coercion-resistant or receipt-free, the main conclusion of this work is that the coercion models should be re-evaluated, and new definitions of coercion and receipt-freeness are necessary. We propose such new definitions as part of this paper and investigate their implications.
Disciplines :
Computer science
Author, co-author :
ROENNE, Peter ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > APSIA
Finogina, Tamara; Internxt, Valencia, Spain
Herranz, Javier; Department Matemàtiques, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain
External co-authors :
yes
Language :
English
Title :
Expanding the Toolbox: Coercion and Vote-Selling at Vote-Casting Revisited
Publication date :
2025
Event name :
E-Vote-ID
Event place :
Tarragona, Esp
Event date :
02-10-2024 => 04-10-2024
Main work title :
Electronic Voting - 9th International Joint Conference, E-Vote-ID 2024, Proceedings
Editor :
Duenas-Cid, David
Publisher :
Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
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