Abstract :
[en] In response to the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, by now, most of the financial transactions must be cleared through central counterparties operating a dynamic margin setting mechanism. High margin calls can reduce counterparty risk in a turbulent market, but at the same time, increase liquidity risk and escalate systemic risk. In this paper, we construct a theoretical model to address this challenge, deriving an optimal margin setting policy framed as a stochastic control problem. Our analysis reveals that an adaptive, countercyclical approach is superior to a purely risk-sensitive strategy, primarily by minimizing the expected loss for the clearing institution.
Funding text :
This research was supported by National Research, Development and Innovation Office - NKFIH, K-138826. Edina Berlinger acknowledge support from the Chair and Research Program in Sustainable Finance at the University of Luxembourg, sponsored by the Ministry of the Environment, Climate and Sustainable Development.
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