[en] In traditional financial markets, front-running is a well-structured phenomenon. It represents a form of privileged actors utilizing knowledge or power advantages to extract undue profit at the cost of other stakeholders. Various mitigation strategies have emerged, ranging from market design to regulatory measures. More recently, a similar and substantially richer variety of means to gain unethical profit from power asymmetries has appeared in the context of blockchain-based decentralized applications. This phenomenon is called “maximal extractable value” (MEV). Despite the decentralized nature and inherent transparency of blockchain ledgers, MEV is particularly prevalent and challenging to mitigate. While related work in computer science and algorithmic game theory has already identified several different ways in which MEV manifests in decentralized finance (DeFi) and outlined partial solution approaches, a discussion of its impacts in the information systems (IS) domain is still absent. A holistic definition of MEV and how it can be exploited is necessary for the discussion of its potential implications for blockchain-based IS for businesses and public institutions. This paper conducts a systematic literature review to close this gap. It consolidates the diverging definitions of MEV and provides a categorization of the different ways in which it can manifest. As such, we synthesize and review the existing state of knowledge on MEV and point to undiscovered areas relevant to decentralized electronic markets in the form of a research agenda.
Centre de recherche :
Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SnT) > FINATRAX - Digital Financial Services and Cross-organizational Digital Transformations NCER-FT - FinTech National Centre of Excellence in Research
Disciplines :
Gestion des systèmes d’information Sciences informatiques
Auteur, co-auteur :
Gramlich, Vincent ; Branch Business Information Systems Engineering, Fraunhofer FIT, Bayreuth, Germany
Jelito, Dennis; University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth, Germany
SCHÖNRICH-SEDLMEIR, Johannes ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > FINATRAX
Co-auteurs externes :
yes
Langue du document :
Anglais
Titre :
Maximal extractable value: Current understanding, categorization, and open research questions
Date de publication/diffusion :
03 octobre 2024
Titre du périodique :
Electronic Markets
ISSN :
1019-6781
eISSN :
1422-8890
Maison d'édition :
Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
FNR16326754 - Privacy-preserving Tokenisation Of Artworks, 2021 (01/06/2022-31/05/2025) - Gilbert Fridgen FNR14783405 - Fintech/Regtech In Space For Trustful Autonomous Robotic Interaction, 2020 (01/07/2021-30/06/2024) - Gilbert Fridgen
Organisme subsidiant :
FNR - Luxembourg National Research Fund Banque et Caisse d’Épargne de l’État, Luxembourg (Spuerkeess) Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA) Bavarian Ministry of Economic Affairs, Regional Development and Energy
Subventionnement (détails) :
Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL. This research was funded in part by the Bavarian Ministry of Economic Affairs, Regional Development and Energy through the project "Fraunhofer Blockchain Center (20-3066-2-6-14)" and the Luxembourg National Research Fund (FNR) in the FiReSPArX (grant reference 14783405) and PABLO (grant reference 16326754) projects, as well as Banque et Caisse d’Épargne de l’État, Luxembourg (Spuerkeess) and the Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA).
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