Abstract :
[en] Distance-bounding protocols are security protocols with a time measurement phase used to detect relay attacks, whose security is typically measured against mafia-fraud and distance-fraud attacks. A prominent subclass of distance-bounding protocols, known as lookup-based protocols, use simple lookup operations to diminish the impact of the computation time in the distance calculation. Independent results have found theoretical lower bounds [Formula presented] and [Formula presented], where n is the number of time measurement rounds, on the security of lookup-based protocols against mafia and distance-fraud attacks, respectively. However, it is still an open question whether there exists a protocol achieving both security bounds. This article closes this question in two ways. First, we prove that the two lower bounds are mutually exclusive, meaning that there does not exist a lookup-based protocol that provides optimal protection against both types of attacks. Second, we provide a lookup-based protocol that approximates those bounds by a small constant factor. Our experiments show that, restricted to a memory size that linearly grows with n, our protocol offers strictly better security than previous lookup-based protocols against both types of fraud.
Funding text :
This research is funded by the Luxembourg National Research Fund, Luxembourg , under the grant AFR-PhD-14565947 . Rolando Trujillo-Rasua is funded by a Ramon y Cajal grant from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation and the European Union (REF: RYC2020-028954-I )
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