Environmental distortions; Food chain; Predator–prey ecosystem; Resource exploitation; Stochastic multidimensional differential games; Tragedy of the commons; Statistics and Probability; Economics and Econometrics; Computer Science Applications; Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design; Computational Theory and Mathematics; Computational Mathematics; Applied Mathematics; Q57; Q56; Q22; Q23; Q27; C73
Résumé :
[en] Ecological instability caused by pollution, climate change, or by exogenous distortions in the food chain of biological organisms may increase the average natural death rate of certain species, or it may increase the variance of their natural death rate, or both. Here, rational noncooperative strategic harvesting in a predator–prey ecosystem that is subject to exogenous environmental disturbances is studied through an example that delivers analytical solutions. When players exploit only one of two interacting species, then in symmetric Markovian–Nash equilibrium: (i) the ‘tragedy of the commons’ holds and (ii) when exogenous factors increase and/or make more volatile the natural geometric death rate of the species under exploitation (of the non-harvested species) each player’s harvesting rate increases (decreases) and the commons problem is intensified (mitigated).
Disciplines :
Sciences économiques & de gestion: Multidisciplinaire, généralités & autres
Auteur, co-auteur :
KOULOVATIANOS, Christos ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Department of Finance (DF)
Co-auteurs externes :
no
Langue du document :
Anglais
Titre :
Rational Noncooperative Strategic Exploitation of Species in a Predator–Prey Ecosystem with Random Disturbances
Financial support from the Austrian Science Fund, Project P17886, is gratefully acknowledged. I am indebted to Ngo Van Long for encouraging me to improve this paper and for his invaluable comments. Ngo Van Long generously summarized a previous version of the main model of this paper in Long [, ]. I also thank two anonymous referees who provided very useful suggestions.
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