Collective Screening

Reference : Collective Screening


	Document type :	Scientific Presentations in Universities or Research Centers : Scientific presentation in universities or research centers
	Discipline(s) :	Business & economic sciences : Microeconomics
	To cite this reference:	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/55993

Title :	Collective Screening
Language :	English
Author, co-author :	Anesi, Vincent [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Department of Economics and Management (DEM) >]
	Buisseret, Peter []
Publication date :	20-Jul-2023
Event name :	22nd AnnualS SAET Conference
Event date :	17-21 July 2023
Event organizer :	Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory
Event place (city) :	Paris
Event country :	France
Abstract :	[en] We study a dynamic principal-agent model in which the principal is a group whose members hold heterogeneous and evolving values from an agreement with the agent. The principals collectively choose the agent’s offer, which binds all principals if the agent accepts. Learning about the agent’s private information reduces the principals’ conflicts over their joint offer, mitigating a principal’s subsequent losses if she is not decisive. As a consequence, a principal in a group prefers to screen the agent more aggressively than a single principal. We study the dynamics of the principals’ collective choice, and obtain conditions under which decisive members of the group successively trade away their decision-making authority, leading inexorably to the concentration of negotiation power in the hands of a single principal.
Permalink :	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/55993

There is no file associated with this reference.

All documents in ORBi^lu are protected by a user license.