ANESI, V., & Buisseret, P. (26 March 2024). The Politics of Bargaining as a Group [Paper presentation]. UNET Seminar, Nottingham, United Kingdom. |
ANESI, V., & Peter Buisseret. (06 March 2024). The Politics of Bargaining as a Group [Paper presentation]. Economics Research Seminar, Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Linz, Austria. |
ANESI, V., & Peter Buisseret. (16 February 2024). The Politics of Bargaining as a Group [Paper presentation]. Economic Theory seminar, Michigan State University. |
ANESI, V., & Buisseret, P. (2023). The Politics of Bargaining as a Group. (CRETA Discussion Paper No: 81). ORBilu-University of Luxembourg. https://orbilu.uni.lu/handle/10993/59516. |
ANESI, V., & Buisseret Peter. (2023). The Politics of Bargaining as a Group. (Working Paper no. 10823). ORBilu-University of Luxembourg. https://orbilu.uni.lu/handle/10993/59523. |
Anesi, V., & Buisseret, P. (20 July 2023). Collective Screening [Paper presentation]. 22nd AnnualS SAET Conference, Paris, France. |
Anesi, V., & Buisseret, P. (12 January 2023). The Politics of Collective Principals [Paper presentation]. Political Economy Seminar, Nashville, Tennessee, United States. |
Anesi, V., & Buisseret, P. (08 January 2023). The Politics of Collective Principals [Paper presentation]. 2023 ASSA Annual Meeting. |
Anesi, V., & Safronov, M. (2023). Deciding When To Decide: Collective Deliberation and Obstruction. International Economic Review, 64 (2), 757-781. doi:10.1111/iere.12614 Peer reviewed |
ANESI, V., & Peter Buisseret. (2023). The Politics of Bargaining as a Group. ORBilu-University of Luxembourg. https://orbilu.uni.lu/handle/10993/57657. |
Anesi, V., & Buisseret, P. (November 2022). Making Elections Work: Accountability with Selection and Control. American Economic Journal. Microeconomics, 14 (4), 616-644. doi:10.1257/mic.20200311 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
Anesi, V., & Buisseret, P. (October 2022). The Politics of Collective Principals [Paper presentation]. Wallis Institute Annual Conference. |
Anesi, V., & Buisseret, P. (September 2022). The Politics of Collective Pricipals [Paper presentation]. Public Economics Seminar. |
Anesi, V., & Buisseret, P. (05 April 2022). Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals [Paper presentation]. Department of Economics Seminar Series. |
Anesi, V., & Buisseret, P. (29 March 2022). Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals [Paper presentation]. Microeconomics Seminar. |
Anesi, V., & Buisseret, P. (23 March 2022). Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals [Paper presentation]. Microeconomics Seminar. |
Anesi, V., & Buisseret, P. (21 March 2022). Screening for Consensus : Delegation with Collective Principals [Paper presentation]. Microeconomics Seminar. |
Anesi, V., & Buisseret, P. (16 March 2022). Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals [Paper presentation]. Political Economy Seminars. |
Anesi, V., & Buisseret, P. (14 March 2022). Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals [Paper presentation]. Microeconomics Research Seminar Series. |
Anesi, V., & Bowen, R. (August 2021). Policy Experimentation in Committees: A Case Against Veto Rights Under Redistributive Constraints. American Economic Journal. Microeconomics, 13 (3), 124-162. doi:10.1257/mic.20190023 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
Anesi, V., & Safronov, M. (2021). Cloturing Deliberation. (Discussion Paper 2021-03). ORBilu-University of Luxembourg. https://orbilu.uni.lu/handle/10993/46112. |
Anesi, V., & Facchini, G. (2019). Coercive Trade Policy. American Economic Journal. Microeconomics, 11, 225-256. doi:10.1257/mic.20170085 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
Anesi, V., & Duggan, J. (2018). Existence and Indeterminacy of Markovian Equilibria in Dynamic Bargaining Games. Theoretical Economics, 13, 505-525. doi:10.3982/TE2215 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
Anesi, V., & Duggan, J. (2017). Dynamic Bargaining and Stability with Veto Players. Games and Economic Behavior, 103, 30-40. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.010 Peer reviewed |
Anesi, V., & Seidmann, D. (2015). Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default. Review of Economic Studies, 82, 825-867. doi:10.1093/restud/rdv009 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
Anesi, V., & Seidmann, D. (2014). Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda. Theoretical Economics, 9, 445-482. doi:10.3982/TE1318 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
Anesi, V., & De Donder, P. (2013). A Coalitional Theory of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection. Economic Theory, 52, 941-977. doi:10.1007/s00199-011-0671-1 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
Anesi, V., & De Donder, P. (2013). Voting under the Threat of Secession: Accommodation vs. Repression. Social Choice and Welfare, 41, 241-261. doi:10.1007/s00355-012-0682-2 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
Anesi, V. (2012). A New Old Solution for Weak Tournaments. Social Choice and Welfare, 39, 919-930. doi:10.1007/s00355-011-0561-2 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
Anesi, V. (2012). Secessionism and Minority Protection in an Uncertain World. Journal of Public Economics, 1-2, 53-61. doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.08.004 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
Anesi, V., & De Donder, P. (2011). Secondary Issues and Party Politics. An Application to Environmental Policy. Social Choice and Welfare, 36, 519-546. doi:10.1007/s00355-010-0506-1 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
Anesi, V. (2010). Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 70, 488-493. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.011 Peer reviewed |
Anesi, V., & De Donder, P. (2009). Party Formation and Minority Ideological Positions. Economic Journal, 119, 1303-1323. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02285.x Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
Anesi, V. (2009). Moral Hazard and Free Riding in Collective Action. Social Choice and Welfare, 32, 197-219. doi:10.1007/s00355-008-0318-8 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
Anesi, V. (2008). Incentives and Prosocial Behavior in Democratic Societies. Journal of Economic Psychology, 29, 849-855. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2008.03.004 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
Anesi, V. (2006). Committees with Farsighted Voters: A New Interpretation of Stable Sets. Social Choice and Welfare, 27, 595-610. doi:10.1007/s00355-006-0146-7 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |
Anesi, V. (2006). Earmarked Taxation and Political Competition. Journal of Public Economics, 90, 679-701. doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.03.005 Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi |