Reference : Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals
Scientific Presentations in Universities or Research Centers : Scientific presentation in universities or research centers
Business & economic sciences : Microeconomics
Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals
Anesi, Vincent mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Department of Economics and Management (DEM) >]
Buisseret, Peter []
Department of Economics Seminar Series
University of Southern Denmark (SDU)
Odense, Denmark
[en] A group of principals collectively and sequentially screen an agent. The principals hold heterogeneous values from the relationship that may evolve over time. At each date, the principals use a collective decision rule to propose a contract to the agent. We unearth circumstances in which every non-dictatorial decision rule yields inefficiency in the form of excessive learning: relative to a single-principal benchmark, collective principals screen the agent too aggressively. They do so in order to reduce uncertainty about the agent’s preferences, and alleviate dynamic conflicts of interest between the principals that exist regardless of their static alignment.

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