Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals

Reference : Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals


	Document type :	Scientific Presentations in Universities or Research Centers : Scientific presentation in universities or research centers
	Discipline(s) :	Business & economic sciences : Microeconomics
	To cite this reference:	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/52751

Title :	Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals
Language :	English
Author, co-author :	Anesi, Vincent [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Department of Economics and Management (DEM) >]
	Buisseret, Peter []
Publication date :	29-Mar-2022
Audience :	International
Event name :	Microeconomics Seminar
Event date :	03/29/2022
Event organizer :	Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Department of Economics
Event place (city) :	Madrid
Abstract :	[en] A group of principals collectively and sequentially screen an agent. The principals hold heterogeneous values from the relationship that may evolve over time. At each date, the principals use a collective decision rule to propose a contract to the agent. We unearth circumstances in which every non-dictatorial decision rule yields inefficiency in the form of excessive learning: relative to a single-principal benchmark, collective principals screen the agent too aggressively. They do so in order to reduce uncertainty about the agent’s preferences, and alleviate dynamic conflicts of interest between the principals that exist regardless of their static alignment.
Permalink :	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/52751

There is no file associated with this reference.

All documents in ORBi^lu are protected by a user license.