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Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals
Anesi, Vincent; Buisseret, Peter
2022
 

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Abstract :
[en] A group of principals collectively and sequentially screen an agent. The principals hold heterogeneous values from the relationship that may evolve over time. At each date, the principals use a collective decision rule to propose a contract to the agent. We unearth circumstances in which every non-dictatorial decision rule yields inefficiency in the form of excessive learning: relative to a single-principal benchmark, collective principals screen the agent too aggressively. They do so in order to reduce uncertainty about the agent’s preferences, and alleviate dynamic conflicts of interest between the principals that exist regardless of their static alignment.
Disciplines :
Microeconomics
Author, co-author :
Anesi, Vincent  ;  University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Department of Economics and Management (DEM)
Buisseret, Peter
Language :
English
Title :
Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals
Publication date :
16 March 2022
Event name :
Political Economy Seminars
Event organizer :
Hong Kong Baptist University
Event date :
03/16/2022
Audience :
International
Available on ORBilu :
since 13 November 2022

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