Reference : The Politics of Collective Principals
Scientific Presentations in Universities or Research Centers : Scientific presentation in universities or research centers
Business & economic sciences : Microeconomics
The Politics of Collective Principals
Anesi, Vincent mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Department of Economics and Management (DEM) >]
Buisseret, Peter []
Wallis Institute Annual Conference
October 7-8, 2022
[en] A group of principals collectively and dynamically screens an agent. The principals hold heterogeneous and evolving values from the relationship. At each date, they use a collective decision rule to determine a joint offer to the agent; the principals may also amend the procedures governing how their joint offer is chosen. Our main result shows how decisive coalitions of principals voluntarily and permanently concentrate decision-making authority in a single principal. It shows that every equilibrium sequence of procedures converges to the dictatorship of a single principal.

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