The Politics of Collective Principals

Reference : The Politics of Collective Principals


	Document type :	Scientific Presentations in Universities or Research Centers : Scientific presentation in universities or research centers
	Discipline(s) :	Business & economic sciences : Microeconomics
	To cite this reference:	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/52745

Title :	The Politics of Collective Principals
Language :	English
Author, co-author :	Anesi, Vincent [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Department of Economics and Management (DEM) >]
	Buisseret, Peter []
Publication date :	Oct-2022
Audience :	International
Event name :	Wallis Institute Annual Conference
Event date :	October 7-8, 2022
Event place (city) :	Rochester
Abstract :	[en] A group of principals collectively and dynamically screens an agent. The principals hold heterogeneous and evolving values from the relationship. At each date, they use a collective decision rule to determine a joint offer to the agent; the principals may also amend the procedures governing how their joint offer is chosen. Our main result shows how decisive coalitions of principals voluntarily and permanently concentrate decision-making authority in a single principal. It shows that every equilibrium sequence of procedures converges to the dictatorship of a single principal.
Permalink :	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/52745

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