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The Politics of Collective Principals
Anesi, Vincent; Buisseret, Peter
2022
 

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Abstract :
[en] A group of principals collectively and dynamically screens an agent. The principals hold heterogeneous and evolving values from the relationship. At each date, they use a collective decision rule to determine a joint offer to the agent; the principals may also amend the procedures governing how their joint offer is chosen. Our main result shows how decisive coalitions of principals voluntarily and permanently concentrate decision-making authority in a single principal. It shows that every equilibrium sequence of procedures converges to the dictatorship of a single principal.
Disciplines :
Microeconomics
Author, co-author :
Anesi, Vincent  ;  University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Department of Economics and Management (DEM)
Buisseret, Peter
Language :
English
Title :
The Politics of Collective Principals
Publication date :
October 2022
Event name :
Wallis Institute Annual Conference
Event date :
October 7-8, 2022
Audience :
International
Available on ORBilu :
since 13 November 2022

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