Reference : Provably Improving Election Verifiability in Belenios
Scientific congresses, symposiums and conference proceedings : Paper published in a book
Engineering, computing & technology : Computer science
Security, Reliability and Trust
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/48238
Provably Improving Election Verifiability in Belenios
English
Baloglu, Sevdenur mailto [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > PI Mauw >]
Bursuc, Sergiu mailto [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > PI Mauw >]
Mauw, Sjouke mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Medicine (FSTM) > Department of Computer Science (DCS) >]
Pang, Jun mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Medicine (FSTM) > Department of Computer Science (DCS) >]
Oct-2021
Electronic Voting 6th International Joint Conference, E-Vote-ID 2021 Virtual Event, October 5–8, 2021, Proceedings
Springer
1-16
Yes
978-3-030-86941-0
Switzerland
6th International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting, E-Vote-ID 2021
from 05-10-2021 to 08-10-2021
[en] Belenios is an online voting system that provides a strong notion of election verifiability, where no single party has to be trusted, and security holds as soon as either the voting registrar or the voting server is honest. It was formally proved to be secure, making the assump- tion that no further ballots are cast on the bulletin board after voters verified their ballots. In practice, however, revoting is allowed and voters can verify their ballots anytime. This gap between formal proofs and use in practice leaves open space for attacks, as has been shown recently. In this paper we make two simple additions to Belenios and we formally prove that the new version satisfies the expected verifiability properties. Our proofs are automatically performed with the Tamarin prover, under the assumption that voters are allowed to vote at most four times.
Researchers ; Professionals ; Students ; General public
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/48243
also: http://hdl.handle.net/10993/48239 ; http://hdl.handle.net/10993/48240 ; http://hdl.handle.net/10993/48244 ; http://hdl.handle.net/10993/48241 ; http://hdl.handle.net/10993/48245
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-86942-7_1
FnR ; FNR11747298 > Peter Y. A. Ryan > SURCVS > Secure, Usable And Robust Cryptographic Voting Systems > 01/08/2018 > 31/07/2022 > 2017

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