Reference : Making Elections Work: Accountability with Selection and Control
Scientific journals : Article
Business & economic sciences : Microeconomics
Making Elections Work: Accountability with Selection and Control
Anesi, Vincent mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Department of Economics and Management (DEM) >]
Buisseret, Peter [Harvard University > Government]
In press
American Economic Journal. Microeconomics
American Economic Association
Yes (verified by ORBilu)
[en] Dynamic elections ; electoral accountability ; political agency
[en] We study the limits of dynamic electoral accountability when voters are uncertain about politicians’ characteristics (adverse selection) and their actions (moral hazard). Existing work argues that voters cannot achieve their first-best payoff. This is attributed to inherent deficiencies of the electoral contract, including voters’ inability to pre-commit, and the restriction to a binary retention-replacement decision. We provide conditions under which, despite these constraints, voters can obtain arbitrarily close to the first-best payoff in an equilibrium of the electoral interaction. Our paper resolves that there need not be a trade-off between selection and control.

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