Dual holdings; Corporate social responsibility; Debt-equity conflict
Résumé :
[en] ABSTRACT
This study sheds light on agency conflicts between creditors and shareholders and their effect on a firm's corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. We find that the presence of institutional investors which simultaneously hold debt and equity claims in the same firm, so-called dual holders, leads to an increase in CSR performance by the firm that is dual-held (the dual holding firm). Using institutional mergers between separate lenders and equity holders as a natural experiment involving the shareholder-creditor conflict, we find that firms which exhibit dual ownership for the first time increase their CSR activities to a greater extent than a matched control group. In line with the previous literature, we interpret our findings as evidence that dual holders internalise agency conflicts. Thus, we find that a reduction in agency conflicts between creditors and shareholders, partly achieved by dual holders, positively affects the CSR activities of dual holdings.
Disciplines :
Finance
Auteur, co-auteur :
Lopatta, Kerstin
Bassen, Alexander
KASPEREIT, Thomas ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Department of Economics and Management (DEM)
Tideman, Sebastian
Buchholz, Daniel
Co-auteurs externes :
yes
Langue du document :
Anglais
Titre :
The effect of institutional dual holdings on CSR performance
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