Reference : Existence and Indeterminacy of Markovian Equilibria in Dynamic Bargaining Games
Scientific journals : Article
Business & economic sciences : Economic systems & public economics
Existence and Indeterminacy of Markovian Equilibria in Dynamic Bargaining Games
Anesi, Vincent mailto [University of Luxembourg > > >]
Duggan, John mailto []
Theoretical Economics
Society for Economic Theory
Yes (verified by ORBilu)
Los Angeles
[en] This paper studies stationary Markov perfect equilibria in multidimensional models of dynamic bargaining, in which the alternative chosen in one period determines the status quo for the next. We generalize a sufficient condition for existence of equilibrium due to Anesi and Seidmann, 2015. We then use this existence result to show that if a weak gradient restriction holds at an alternative, then when players are sufficiently patient, there is a continuum of equilibria with absorbing sets arbitrarily close to that alternative. A sufficient condition for our gradient restriction is that the gradients of all players' utilities are linearly independent at that alternative. When the dimensionality of the set of alternatives is high, this linear independence condition holds at almost all alternatives, and equilibrium absorbing sets are dense in the set of alternatives. This implies that constructive techniques, which are common in the literature, fail to identify many plausible outcomes in dynamic bargaining games.

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