Article (Scientific journals)
Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games
Anesi, Vincent
2010In Games and Economic Behavior, 70, p. 488-493
Peer reviewed
 

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Abstract :
[en] This short note studies the noncooperative foundations of von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets in voting games. To do so, we study stationary Markov equilibria (SMEs) of a noncooperative legislative bargaining game, based on underlying simple games. The following result emerges from such an exercise: Every stable set of the underlying simple game is the limit set of pure strategy, stage-undominated SMEs of the bargaining game when voters are sufficiently farsighted.
Disciplines :
Economic systems & public economics
Author, co-author :
Anesi, Vincent  ;  University of Luxembourg
External co-authors :
no
Language :
English
Title :
Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games
Publication date :
2010
Journal title :
Games and Economic Behavior
ISSN :
1090-2473
Publisher :
Elsevier, Atlanta, Georgia
Volume :
70
Pages :
488-493
Peer reviewed :
Peer reviewed
Available on ORBilu :
since 19 September 2020

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