Reference : Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games
Scientific journals : Article
Business & economic sciences : Economic systems & public economics
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/44307
Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games
English
Anesi, Vincent mailto [University of Luxembourg > > >]
2010
Games and Economic Behavior
Elsevier
70
488-493
Yes (verified by ORBilu)
International
0899-8256
1090-2473
Atlanta
GE
[en] This short note studies the noncooperative foundations of von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets in voting games. To do so, we study stationary Markov equilibria (SMEs) of a noncooperative legislative bargaining game, based on underlying simple games. The following result emerges from such an exercise: Every stable set of the underlying simple game is the limit set of pure strategy, stage-undominated SMEs of the bargaining game when voters are sufficiently farsighted.
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/44307
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0899825610000400

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