Reference : A New Old Solution for Weak Tournaments
Scientific journals : Article
Business & economic sciences : Economic systems & public economics
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/44306
A New Old Solution for Weak Tournaments
English
Anesi, Vincent mailto [University of Luxembourg > > >]
2012
Social Choice and Welfare
Springer
39
919-930
Yes (verified by ORBilu)
International
0176-1714
1432-217X
Germany
[en] This article uncovers dynamic properties of the von Neumann–Morgenstern solution in weak tournaments and majoritarian games. We propose a new procedure for the construction of choice sets from weak tournaments, based on dynamic stability criteria. The idea is to analyze dynamic versions of tournament games. The exploration of a specific class of Markov perfect equilibria in these "dynamic tournament games" yields a new solution concept for weak tournaments—the A-stable set. The alternatives in an A-stable set constitute persistent, long-run policy outcomes in the corresponding dynamic tournament games. We find that, in any weak tournament, the class of A-stable sets coincides with that of von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets.
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/44306
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-011-0561-2

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