Reference : Moral Hazard and Free Riding in Collective Action
Scientific journals : Article
Business & economic sciences : Economic systems & public economics
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/44305
Moral Hazard and Free Riding in Collective Action
English
Anesi, Vincent mailto [University of Luxembourg > > >]
2009
Social Choice and Welfare
Springer
32
197-219
Yes (verified by ORBilu)
International
0176-1714
1432-217X
Germany
[en] Most political and economic theorists point to moral hazard in teams as the main obstacle to lobbies’ collective action. In this paper, we address this important issue with a coalition-formation game. In the process of doing so, we characterize equilibrium lobby structures both in the absence and in the presence of moral hazard. Three notable results emerge from such an exercise: (1) an equilibrium lobby structure exists under both specifications of the model, (2) moral hazard in teams may raise large groups’ equilibrium lobby size, and (3) it may also raise the level of collective action of large groups with low organizational costs.
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/44305
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-008-0318-8

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