Reference : Committees with Farsighted Voters: A New Interpretation of Stable Sets
Scientific journals : Article
Business & economic sciences : Economic systems & public economics
Committees with Farsighted Voters: A New Interpretation of Stable Sets
Anesi, Vincent mailto [University of Luxembourg > > >]
Social Choice and Welfare
Yes (verified by ORBilu)
[en] The interpretation of von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets in voting games has been debated by most political scientists. The present paper addresses the issue in a model that consists of an infinite sequence of repetitions of the standard committee game. The analysis of equilibrium processes leads to the following conclusion: when voters are farsighted, an alternative is the limit of an absorbing equilibrium process if and only if it belongs to some stable set of the underlying committee game. While the traditional interpretation of the core implicitly assumes myopic voters, we also demonstrate that the core of a strong committee is the unique limit of all absorbing equilibrium processes, provided that voters are arbitrarily patient. We finally proceed to an analysis of the Condorcet Paradox in this dynamic context.

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