2012 • In Proceedings of 18th International Conference "Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems", as Part of the European Joint Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2012, Tallinn, Estonia, March 24 - April 1, 2012.
[en] The AVANTSSAR Platform is an integrated toolset for the formal specification and automated validation of trust and security of service-oriented architectures and other applications in the Internet of Services. The platform supports application-level specification languages (such as BPMN and our custom languages) and features three validation backends (CL-AtSe, OFMC, and SATMC), which provide a range of complementary automated reasoning techniques (including service orchestration, compositional reasoning, model checking, and abstract interpretation). We have applied the platform to a large number of industrial case studies, collected into the AVANTSSAR Library of validated problem cases. In doing so, we unveiled a number of problems and vulnerabilities in deployed services. These include, most notably, a serious flaw in the SAML-based Single Sign-On for Google Apps (now corrected by Google as a result of our findings). We also report on the migration of the platform to industry.
Disciplines :
Sciences informatiques
Identifiants :
UNILU:UL-CONFERENCE-2012-439
Auteur, co-auteur :
Armando, Alessandro
Arsac, Wihem
AVANESOV, Tigran ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT)
The AVANTSSAR Platform for the Automated Validation of Trust and Security of Service-Oriented Architectures
Date de publication/diffusion :
2012
Nom de la manifestation :
18th International Conference, TACAS 2012,
Lieu de la manifestation :
Tallinn, Estonie
Date de la manifestation :
March 24 - April 1, 2012
Titre de l'ouvrage principal :
Proceedings of 18th International Conference "Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems", as Part of the European Joint Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2012, Tallinn, Estonia, March 24 - April 1, 2012.
Maison d'édition :
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
ISBN/EAN :
978-3-642-28755-8
Pagination :
267-282
Peer reviewed :
Peer reviewed
Commentaire :
7214 2012
Proceedings of 18th International Conference, TACAS 2012, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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