2010 • In CRiSIS 2010, Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Risks and Security of Internet and Systems, Montreal, QC, Canada, October 10-13, 2010.
[en] Many decision problems on security protocols can be reduced to solving so-called intruder constraints in Dolev Yao model. Most constraint solving procedures for protocol security rely on two properties of constraint systems called monotonicity and variable-origination. In this work we relax these restrictions by giving an NP decision procedure for solving general intruder constraints (that do not have these properties). Our result extends a first work by L. Mazaré in several directions: we allow non-atomic keys, and an associative, commutative and idempotent symbol (for modeling sets). We also give several new applications of the result.
Disciplines :
Sciences informatiques
Identifiants :
UNILU:UL-CONFERENCE-2012-442
Auteur, co-auteur :
AVANESOV, Tigran ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT)
Chevalier, Yannick
Rusinowitch, Michael
Turuani, Mathieu
Langue du document :
Anglais
Titre :
Satisfiability of general intruder constraints with a set constructor
Date de publication/diffusion :
2010
Nom de la manifestation :
CRiSIS 2010
Lieu de la manifestation :
Montreal, QC, Canada
Date de la manifestation :
October 10-13, 2010
Titre de l'ouvrage principal :
CRiSIS 2010, Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Risks and Security of Internet and Systems, Montreal, QC, Canada, October 10-13, 2010.
Maison d'édition :
IEEE
ISBN/EAN :
978-1-4244-8641-0
Pagination :
1-8
Peer reviewed :
Peer reviewed
Commentaire :
Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Risks and Security of Internet and Systems (CRiSIS 2010)
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