[en] Belief change and non-monotonic reasoning are usually viewed as two sides of the same coin, with results showing that one can formally be defined in terms of the other. In this paper we investigate the integration of the two formalisms by studying belief change for a (preferential) non-monotonic framework. We show that the standard AGM approach to be- lief change can be transferred to a preferential non-monotonic framework in the sense that change operations can be defined on conditional knowledge bases. We take as a point of depar- ture the results presented by Casini and Meyer (2017), and we develop and extend such results with characterisations based on semantics and entrenchment relations, showing how some of the constructions defined for propositional logic can be lifted to our preferential non-monotonic framework.
Disciplines :
Sciences informatiques
Auteur, co-auteur :
CASINI, Giovanni ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC)
Ferme, Eduardo; Universidade da Madeira > NOVA-LINCS > Associate Professor
Meyer, Thomas; University of Cape Town > Computer Science > Full Professor
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