Reference : THE CAPACITY FOR COMPLIANCE WITHIN EU MULTILEVEL ADMINISTRATION: THE CASE OF THE BANK...
Dissertations and theses : Doctoral thesis
Law, criminology & political science : Political science, public administration & international relations
Law / European Law
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/36431
THE CAPACITY FOR COMPLIANCE WITHIN EU MULTILEVEL ADMINISTRATION: THE CASE OF THE BANKING UNION’S SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM (SSM)
English
Gren, Jakub[University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Language and Literature, Humanities, Arts and Education (FLSHASE) > Identités, Politiques, Sociétés, Espaces (IPSE) >]
8-Jan-2018
University of Luxembourg, Frankfurt, Germany
Docteur en Sciences Politiques
419
Howarth, David
Harmsen, Robert
Mendes, Joana
Quaglia, Lucia
Spendzharova, Aneta
[en] Single Supervisory Mechanism ; Principal-Agent ; compliance
[en] This dissertation offers a deep political science insight into the functioning of the EU new multilevel administrative system governing the micro-prudential supervision of credit institutions operating in the Single Market. It aims to explain the conditions affecting the formal top-bottom compliance expectation within this multilevel system. In doing so, it engages in the institutional analysis of the organisational and operational design of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM).
Researchers ; Professionals ; Students ; General public ; Others