Single Supervisory Mechanism; Principal-Agent; compliance
Abstract :
[en] This dissertation offers a deep political science insight into the functioning of the EU new multilevel administrative system governing the micro-prudential supervision of credit institutions operating in the Single Market. It aims to explain the conditions affecting the formal top-bottom compliance expectation within this multilevel system. In doing so, it engages in the institutional analysis of the organisational and operational design of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM).
Disciplines :
Political science, public administration & international relations
Author, co-author :
Gren, Jakub ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Language and Literature, Humanities, Arts and Education (FLSHASE) > Identités, Politiques, Sociétés, Espaces (IPSE)
Language :
English
Title :
THE CAPACITY FOR COMPLIANCE WITHIN EU MULTILEVEL ADMINISTRATION: THE CASE OF THE BANKING UNION’S SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM (SSM)
Defense date :
08 January 2018
Number of pages :
419
Institution :
Unilu - University of Luxembourg, Frankfurt, Luxembourg