2017 • In Proceedings of the 24th ACM Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS) 16th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (ACM WPES 2017)
Panchenko, Andriy ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC)
Mitseva, Asya ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC)
Engel, Thomas ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC)
External co-authors :
yes
Language :
English
Title :
Analysis of Fingerprinting Techniques for Tor Hidden Services
Publication date :
31 October 2017
Event name :
24th ACM Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS) 16th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (ACM WPES 2017)
Event organizer :
ACM
Event place :
Dallas, United States
Event date :
31.10-2017-4.11.2017
Main work title :
Proceedings of the 24th ACM Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS) 16th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (ACM WPES 2017)
Peer reviewed :
Peer reviewed
Focus Area :
Security, Reliability and Trust
European Projects :
H2020 - 653426 - PRIVACY FLAG - Enabling Crowd-sourcing based privacy protection for smartphone applications, websites and Internet of Things deployments
FnR Project :
FNR10486741 > Andriy Panchenko > PETIT > Privacy Enhancing Techniques For Future Internet > 01/09/2016 > 31/08/2019 > 2015
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