Reference : The Political Economy of European Capital Markets Union |
Scientific journals : Article | |||
Law, criminology & political science : Political science, public administration & international relations | |||
Finance | |||
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/28242 | |||
The Political Economy of European Capital Markets Union | |
English | |
Howarth, David ![]() | |
Quaglia, Lucia ![]() | |
Liebe, Moritz ![]() | |
Aug-2016 | |
Journal of Common Market Studies | |
Blackwell Publishing | |
54 | |
S1 | |
185–203 | |
Yes (verified by ORBilu) | |
International | |
0021-9886 | |
1468-5965 | |
[en] Capital Markets Union ; European Single Market ; European Union | |
[en] In September 2015 the European Commission put forward an Action Plan for Capital
Markets Union (CMU) and two legislative proposals concerning securitization. Further legislative activity was to follow. This contribution undertakes a preliminary investigation of the ‘making’ of the CMU project, explaining what CMU is, its economic and political objectives, as well as its main drivers and obstacles. It is argued that the likely winners and losers of the project – both financial groups and specific Member State governments – largely formed the constituencies for and against CMU. The organization of national financial (and specifically banking) systems largely directed Member State government preferences on CMU. The potential winners were also influential in promoting a specific form of CMU, or at least specific priorities in the construction of CMU. The centrality of banks in EU national financial systems explains the priority attached to securitization in the first stage of the CMU project. | |
Researchers ; Students ; General public | |
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/28242 | |
10.1111/jcms.12429 |
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