Prêt à Voter; e-voting; voting protocol; security; Australian votiung system; end-to-end-verifiable
Abstract :
[en] This paper describes the design of a supervised verifiable voting protocol suitable for use for elections in the state of Victoria, Australia. We provide a brief overview of the style and nature of the elections held in Victoria and associated challenges. Our protocol, based on Prêt à Voter, presents a new ballot overprinting front-end design, which assists the voter in completing the potentially complex ballot. We also present and analyse a series of modifications to the back-end that will enable it to handle the large number of candidates, 35+ , with ranking single transferable vote (STV), which some Victorian elections require. We conclude with a threat analysis of the scheme and a discussion on the impact of the modifications on the integrity and privacy assumptions of Prêt à Voter.
Peacock, Thea ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT)
Ryan, Peter ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC)
Schneider, Steve; University of Surrey, UK
Teague, Vanessa; University of Melbourne, Australia
Wen, Roland; University of New South Wales, Australia
Xia, Zhe; University of Surrey, UK
Srinivasan, Sriramkrishnan; University of Surrey, UK
External co-authors :
yes
Language :
English
Title :
A Supervised Verifiable Voting Protocol for the Victorian Electoral Commission
Publication date :
2012
Event name :
EVOTE 2012
Event place :
Lochau/Bregenz, Austria
Event date :
July 11-14, 2012
Audience :
International
Journal title :
EVOTE 2012
Publisher :
Competence Center for Electronic Voting and Participation