Peacock, Thea[University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > >]
Ryan, Peter[University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
Competence Center for Electronic Voting and Participation
1-10
Yes
International
EVOTE 2012
July 11-14, 2012
Lochau/Bregenz
Austria
[en] Prêt à Voter ; e-voting ; voting protocol ; security ; Australian votiung system ; end-to-end-verifiable
[en] This paper describes the design of a supervised verifiable voting protocol suitable for use for elections in the state of Victoria, Australia. We provide a brief overview of the style and nature of the elections held in Victoria and associated challenges. Our protocol, based on Prêt à Voter, presents a new ballot overprinting front-end design, which assists the voter in completing the potentially complex ballot. We also present and analyse a series of modifications to the back-end that will enable it to handle the large number of candidates, 35+ , with ranking single transferable vote (STV), which some Victorian elections require. We conclude with a threat analysis of the scheme and a discussion on the impact of the modifications on the integrity and privacy assumptions of Prêt à Voter.