Article (Scientific journals)
Optimal Employment Subsidies to Heterogeneous Workers: Unemployment-Trap, Job-Additionality and Tax Rates
Picard, Pierre M
2001In Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 62, p. 97-127
Peer reviewed
 

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Abstract :
[en] Unemployment and welfare benefits generate unemployment traps. In this paper, we design the optimal employment subsidies that allow governments to reduce unemployment traps under constant budget deficit and without diminishing workers' welfare. We explore the effects of work incentives on the shape and on the properties of employment subsidies. We finally address the issues of self-help effect and job-additionality.
Disciplines :
Business & economic sciences: Multidisciplinary, general & others
Author, co-author :
Picard, Pierre M ;  University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA)
External co-authors :
yes
Language :
English
Title :
Optimal Employment Subsidies to Heterogeneous Workers: Unemployment-Trap, Job-Additionality and Tax Rates
Publication date :
2001
Journal title :
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique
ISSN :
0769-489X
eISSN :
2115-4430
Publisher :
Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (ADRES), Paris, France
Volume :
62
Pages :
97-127
Peer reviewed :
Peer reviewed
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