[en] Unemployment and welfare benefits generate unemployment
traps. In this paper, we design the optimal employment subsidies that
allow governments to reduce unemployment traps under constant budget
deficit and without diminishing workers' welfare. We explore the effects of
work incentives on the shape and on the properties of employment subsidies.
We finally address the issues of self-help effect and job-additionality.
Disciplines :
Sciences économiques & de gestion: Multidisciplinaire, généralités & autres
Auteur, co-auteur :
PICARD, Pierre M ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA)
Co-auteurs externes :
yes
Langue du document :
Anglais
Titre :
Optimal Employment Subsidies to Heterogeneous Workers: Unemployment-Trap, Job-Additionality and Tax Rates
Date de publication/diffusion :
2001
Titre du périodique :
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique
ISSN :
0769-489X
eISSN :
2272-6497
Maison d'édition :
Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (ADRES), Paris, France
