Reference : Highly precise taint analysis for Android applications |
Reports : Other | |||
Engineering, computing & technology : Computer science | |||
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/25162 | |||
Highly precise taint analysis for Android applications | |
English | |
Fritz, Christian [> >] | |
Arzt, Steven [> >] | |
Rasthofer, Siegfried [> >] | |
Bodden, Eric [> >] | |
Bartel, Alexandre [> >] | |
Klein, Jacques ![]() | |
Le Traon, Yves ![]() | |
Octeau, Damien [> >] | |
McDaniel, Patrick [> >] | |
8-Mar-2013 | |
[en] Today’s smart phones are a ubiquitous source of private and
confidential data. At the same time, smartphone users are plagued by malicious apps that exploit their given privileges to steal such sensitive data, or to track users without their consent or even the users noticing. Dynamic program analyses fail to discover such malicious activity because apps have learned to recognize the analyses as they execute. In this work we present FlowDroid, a novel and highly precise taint analysis for Android applications. A precise model of Android’s lifecycle allows the analysis to properly handle callbacks, while context, flow, field and objectsensitivity allows the analysis to track taints with a degree of precision unheard of from previous Android analyses. We also propose DroidBench, an open test suite for evaluating the e↵ectiveness and accuracy of taint-analysis tools specifically for Android apps. As we show through a set of experiments using SecuriBench Micro, DroidBench and a set of well-known Android test applications, our approach finds a very high fraction of data leaks while keeping the rate of false positives low. On DroidBench, our approach achieves 93% recall and 86% precision, greatly outperforming the commercial tools AppScan Source and Fortify SCA. | |
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/25162 |
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