Reference : Supranational Banking Supervision in Europe: The Construction of a Credible Watchdog
Scientific journals : Article
Law, criminology & political science : Political science, public administration & international relations
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/21449
Supranational Banking Supervision in Europe: The Construction of a Credible Watchdog
English
Howarth, David mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Language and Literature, Humanities, Arts and Education (FLSHASE) > Identités, Politiques, Sociétés, Espaces (IPSE) >]
Quaglia, Lucia mailto [University of York > Political Science]
Gren, Jakub mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Language and Literature, Humanities, Arts and Education (FLSHASE) > Identités, Politiques, Sociétés, Espaces (IPSE) >]
2015
Journal of Common Market Studies
Blackwell Publishing
53
s1
TBD
Yes (verified by ORBilu)
International
0021-9886
1468-5965
United Kingdom
[en] Bank Supervision ; European Central Bank ; Banking Union ; Single Supervision Mechanism ; European Union
[en] Does the institutional design of the European Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and its first assessment of systemically important bank stability bolster the credibility of supranational banking supervision in Europe? One crucial measure of credibility with regard to the SSM and NCA supervision of less significant banks — the large majority of euro area headquartered bank not subject to direct ECB supervision — is the assurance of consistent supervision in the euro area. This involves some degree of convergence of NCA supervision in order to prevent national supervisory forebearance of struggling banks. This contribution thus examines whether or not the design of the SSM provides the foundation to build convergence in euro area supervision of less significant banks, despite very different national supervisory practices and institutional frameworks. The Principal-Agent approach is used to assess the credibility of the SSM design in terms of providing the foundation for consistent supervision. This contribution also examines the credibility of the ECB’s direct supervision of significant banks. The management of the ECB’s Comprehensive Assessment of signficant banks can be seen as the first step in demonstrating the capacity of the ECB to make difficult decisions with regard to the stability of the euro area’s banks.
Researchers ; Professionals ; Students
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/21449
10.1111/jcms.12271

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