Reference : Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly
Scientific journals : Article
Business & economic sciences : Economic systems & public economics
Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly
Auriol, Emmanuelle [> >]
Picard, Pierre M. mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA) >]
Economic Journal
Blackwell Publishing
Yes (verified by ORBilu)
[en] Privatization ; soft-budget constraint ; regulation ; natural monopoly ; adverse selection
[en] The article studies the impact of the government budget constraint on the regulation of natural monopolies in adverse selection contexts. The government maximises total surplus but incurs some cost of public funds "à la" Laffont and Tirole (1993). Government outsourcing is proposed as an alternative to regulation in which firms freely enter the market and choose their prices and output levels. However the government can contract "ex post" with the private firms. This "ex post" contracting set-up allows more flexibility than regulation where governments commit to both investment and operation cash-flows. This is especially relevant in case of high technological uncertainties. Copyright � The Author(s). Journal compilation � Royal Economic Society 2009.
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