Reference : Sustainable Migration Policies |
E-prints/Working papers : Already available on another site | |||
Business & economic sciences : International economics | |||
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/12878 | |||
Sustainable Migration Policies | |
English | |
Picard, Pierre M. ![]() | |
Worrall, Tim [> >] | |
2011 | |
The University of Manchester | |
The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series | |
Yes | |
[en] Migration ; Self-enforcing Mechanism ; Repeated Games | |
[en] This paper considers whether countries might mutually agree a policy of allowing
free movement of workers. For the countries to agree, the short run costs must outweighed by the long term benefits that result from better labor market flexibility and income smoothing. We show that such policies are less likely to be adopted for less risk averse workers and for countries that trade more. More surprisingly we find that some congestion costs can help. This reverses the conventional wisdom that congestion costs tend to inhibit free migration policies. | |
Researchers ; Students | |
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/12878 | |
http://wwwen.uni.lu/content/download/30831/368147/file/2010_12-Sustainable%20Migration%20Policies.pdf |
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