Reference : State Owned Firms: Private Debt, Cost Revelation and Welfare
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Business & economic sciences : Microeconomics
State Owned Firms: Private Debt, Cost Revelation and Welfare
Picard, Pierre M. mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA) >]
Rusli, Ridwan [> >]
Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg
CREA Discussion Paper Series
[en] State-owned firms ; privatization ; debt ; information asymmetry
[en] In this paper we study the role of private debt financing in disciplining a state owned firm operating for a government that incurs a cost of public financing. We show that debt contracts allow the government to avoid socially costly subsidies by letting unprofitable state- owned firms default. Debt is never used when the firm and government share the same information about the firm. By contrast, when the state-owned firm has private information, the government has an incentive to use debt to reduce the firm's information rents. We identify the conditions under which a positive debt level benefits governments. They depend on the cost of public funds, the interbank funding rate, the share of foreign investors, the level and uncertainty of the firm's cost.
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