![]() ![]() | TOSZA, S., & VOORDECKERS, O. (2024). An anti-money laundering authority for the European Union: a new center of gravity in AML enforcement. ERA-Forum: Scripta Iuris Europaei. doi:10.1007/s12027-024-00805-9 ![]() |
VOORDECKERS, O. (2020). National Banking Law in the European Single Supervisory Mechanism [Doctoral thesis, Unilu - University of Luxembourg]. ORBilu-University of Luxembourg. https://orbilu.uni.lu/handle/10993/44296 |
COVOLO, V.* , & VOORDECKERS, O.*. (2020). Luxembourg. In S. ALLEGREZZA, The Enforcement Dimension of the Single Supervisory Mechanism. Wolters Kluwer. ![]() * These authors have contributed equally to this work. |
VOORDECKERS, O.* , & LAMBERIGTS, S.*. (2020). Belgium. In S. ALLEGREZZA, The Enforcement Dimension of the Single Supervisory Mechanism. Wolters Kluwer. ![]() * These authors have contributed equally to this work. |
VOORDECKERS, O. (2020). Administrative and Judicial Review of Supervisory Acts and Decisions under the SSM. In S. ALLEGREZZA, The Enforcement Dimension of the Single Supervisory Mechanism. Wolters Kluwer. ![]() |
VOORDECKERS, O. (2019). The Uncertain Competence of the European Central Bank to Exercise National Supervisory Powers: An Analysis of the Powers of the CSSF. Bulletin Droit et Banque, 2019 (64). ![]() |
![]() ![]() | VOORDECKERS, O. (May 2017). La fourniture transfrontalière de services bancaires et financiers après Brexit. Revue internationale des services financiers, 2017 (1), 76-83. ![]() |
VOORDECKERS, O. (2017). Challenges Related to the Power of the European Central Bank to Apply National Law. In M. Szabó, P. L. Láncos, ... R. Varga, Hungarian Yearbook of International Law and European Law. Boom. ![]() |
![]() ![]() | ALLEGREZZA, S., & VOORDECKERS, O. (2015). Investigative and sanctioning powers of the ECB in the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism: mapping the complexity of a new enforcement model. EUCRIM, 4, 151-160. |
VOORDECKERS, O. (2013). La commune et ses acquisitions immobilières. Les cahiers de la faculté de droit, 2013 (50). ![]() |