Cournot competition; oligopolistic non-cooperative dynamic games; tragedy of the commons
Résumé :
[en] We analyze imperfect competition in dynamic environments where firms use rivalrous but nonexcludable industry-specific capital that is provided exogenously. Capital depreciation depends on utilization, so firms influence the evolution of the capital equipment through more or less intensive supply in the final-goods market. Strategic incentives stem from, (i) a dynamic externality, arising due to the non-excludability of the capital stock, leading firms to compete for its use (rivalry), and, (ii) a market externality, leading to the classic Cournot-type supply competition. Comparing alternative market structures, we isolate the effect of these externalities on strategies and industry growth.
Disciplines :
Microéconomie
Identifiants :
UNILU:UL-ARTICLE-2013-091
Auteur, co-auteur :
KOULOVATIANOS, Christos ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA)
Mirman, Leonard; Department of Economics, University of Virginia
Langue du document :
Anglais
Titre :
The Effects of Market Structure on Industry Growth: Rivalrous Non-excludable Capital
