Abstract :
[en] In this work, we present new cryptanalytic attacks on recently proposed, theory-inspired constructions of weak pseudorandom functions (weak-PRFs). We demonstrate attacks on several such designs, showing that the initial security arguments require significant refinement. Methodologically, our approach relies on novel observations about the structure of cyclic matrices, applications of Wagner’s generalized birthday technique, and conversion into polynomial systems over F3. These findings highlight the need for a more careful analysis of those weak-PRF candidates.
Funding text :
This work started at the ALPSY 2025 workshop organized by Arnab Roy and ChristianRechberger at the Obergurgl center of the University of Innsbruck. We are grateful for theorganizers for providing a great opportunity for joint research. Kai Hu is supported bythe National Cryptologic Science Fund of China (2025NCSF02007), the Natural ScienceFoundation of Shandong Province (2025HWYQ-025), and the Natural Science Foundationof Jiangsu Province (BK20240420). This work was (in part) supported by the European Re-search Council (ERC) project 101097056 (SYMTRUST). Aleksei Udovenko was supportedby Luxembourg’s FNR project PQseal (C24/IS/18978392).
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