The (Un)intentional Failure of Europeanization: The EU and the Democratic Backsliding in Southeast Europe

The last ten years have been some of the most challenging in EU’s history. Faced with a string of crises – from the migrant crisis and Brexit, through the Covid-19 pandemic to the war in Ukraine and the energy crisis that followed – the EU has also seen its foundations shaken from within by the rise of right-wing populism and the democratic backsliding of some of its member states. These challenges to the EU’s strength and cohesion have been mirrored by the events taking place in the Union’s immediate neighborhood – especially in the countries of Southeast Europe (SEE) still hoping for EU accession. Over the past ten years, these countries have faced serious challenges to their democracies, constitutional systems, strategic orientation toward European integrations, and even statehood. The democratic backsliding and the accompanying rise of right-wing populism in SEE has been exacerbated by the state of de facto collapse of the process of Europeanization and the waning interest of the EU in the region, as well as the entry of outside players like Russia and China into regional politics. The effects of these developments could be catastrophic, as the region continues to be ruled by hybrid, unstable, and fragile regimes where political entrepreneurs use social polarization to retain power. What is particularly troubling, this social polarization is kept salient through the use of some of the same issues that led to the violent collapse of the Yugoslav federation more than three decades ago. The constitutional structure and integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina are contested, as are the independence and integrity of Kosovo. Right-wing populist and nationalist parties are in power in Serbia and in Montenegro, dividing the public over the previously resolved question of the union between the two states. The status of the Albanian minority in North Macedonia is also contested, as is the political stability of the whole country. To all of this one must add the devastating economic crisis sparked by the Covid-19 pandemic and the scene is set for a political maelstrom that could destroy the prospects for the region’s integration into the EU for generations to come. This state of affairs in Southeast Europe, however, did not come about suddenly. It is the direct product of the policies implemented by the different EU-level political actors over the past three decades, as well as of the rational calculations by the regional politicians on how to solidify their hold on power. This is why the central question of this project is: How and why has the EU (un)intentionally contributed to the collapse of Europeanization and to the democratic backsliding in Southeast Europe? The EU itself has been divided on the Europeanization, democratization, and ultimately integration of Southeast Europe. It has also been divided on its policy responses to the rise of right-wing populism and authoritarianism among its member states, and on its responses to the policy challenges from other powers like the United States, Russia, and China. However, its divisions in these three crucial policy fields rarely feature in the scholarly accounts of the failures and successes of its approach in Southeast Europe. This study goes against that trend. It examines the political, institutional and geopolitical (f)actors which influenced the EU process of decision making and adoption of strategies for SEE that (in)directly contributed to democratic backsliding in the region. It lifts the veil of policymaking and political negotiations within the EU and between the EU and SEE countries, and exposes how and why EU policies toward SEE are failing to promote democracy, but are instead encouraging authoritarianism. Lessons learned and recommendations made are portable across regions and can serve the EU in the process of future European Neighborhood Policy evaluation and making.