From Knowledge to Action: Logics of Permitted and Obligatory Announcements

Action logic; Dynamic contexts; Epistemic state; Formalisation; Generalisation; Policy compliance; Privacy policies; Security policy; Statics and dynamics; Artificial Intelligence

Abstract :

[en] We formalize the notions of “permitted and obligatory announcements” in the context of information security, such as privacy policy compliance. In a sender-receiver setting, we define the sender’s permitted and obligatory announcements in terms of the receiver’s ideal epistemic states (i.e., the epistemic states that comply with the given security policies). We propose two logics, LPOA and DLPOA, to reason about permitted and obligatory announcements in static and dynamic contexts, respectively. These two logics are completely axiomatized, and we also study generalizations in which the receiver’s knowledge is characterized by non-S5 logics. Our paper makes two main contributions to the formalization of permitted and obligatory announcements: First, we clarify the interplay between the sender’s permitted and obligatory announcements and the receiver’s knowledge. Second, we distinguish between weakly and strongly permitted announcements.

Disciplines :

Computer science

Author, co-author :

LI, Xu ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Medicine (FSTM) > Department of Computer Science (DCS)

Aucher, Guillaume; Univ Rennes, CNRS, IRISA, IRMAR, France

GABBAY, Dov ; University of Luxembourg

MARKOVICH, Réka ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Medicine (FSTM) > Department of Computer Science (DCS)

External co-authors :

yes

Language :

English

Title :

From Knowledge to Action: Logics of Permitted and Obligatory Announcements

Publication date :

2025

Journal title :

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

ISSN :

1076-9757

eISSN :

1943-5037

Publisher :

AI Access Foundation

Volume :

Pages :

1629 - 1672

Peer reviewed :

Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi

Additional URL :

https://jair.org/index.php/jair/article/download/17180/27154

Funding text :

A preliminary version of this paper has been published in the Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (Li et al., 2022). We thank three anonymous referees of this journal for their valuable comments which clarified some conceptual confusion and improved the exposition of this paper. Thanks are also given to Leendert van der Torre for discussions and comments on earlier drafts of this paper. This work was supported by the Fonds National de la Recherche Luxembourg through the project Deontic Logic for Epistemic Rights (OPEN O20/14776480).

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