2025 • In Haslhofer, Bernhard (Ed.) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2025 International Workshops - CoDecFin, FinTeAchin, VOTING, 2025, Revised Selected Papers
[en] Electronic voting schemes typically ensure ballot privacy by assuming that the decryption key is distributed among tallying authorities, preventing any single authority from decrypting a voter’s ballot. However, this assumption may fail in a fully dishonest environment where all tallying authorities collude to break ballot privacy. In this work, we introduce the notion of anamorphic voting, which enables voters to convey their true voting intention to an auditor while casting an (apparently) regular ballot. We present new cryptographic techniques demonstrating that several existing voting schemes can support anamorphic voting.
Disciplines :
Computer science
Author, co-author :
Giustolisi, Rosario; IT University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
RAKEEI, Mohammadamin ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust > IRiSC > Team Gabriele LENZINI
LENZINI, Gabriele ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > IRiSC
External co-authors :
yes
Language :
English
Title :
Anamorphic Voting: Ballot Freedom Against Dishonest Authorities
Publication date :
06 November 2025
Event name :
Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2025 International Workshops
Event place :
Miyakojima, Jpn
Event date :
18-04-2025
Main work title :
Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2025 International Workshops - CoDecFin, FinTeAchin, VOTING, 2025, Revised Selected Papers
Editor :
Haslhofer, Bernhard
Publisher :
Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Rakeei and Lenzini\u2019s research is supported by the ANR and FNR international project INTER/AN/20/14926102-\u201CSecure and Verifiable Electronic Testing and Assessment Systems\u201D (SEVERITAS).
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