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The ECB's Evolving Mandate and High Independence: An Undemocratic Mix
HÖGENAUER, Anna-Lena; MENDES, Joana
2025In Politics and Governance, 13
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Ditching the Maastricht Model_ The Evolving Role of the European Central Bank in the Economic and Monetary Union.pdf
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Keywords :
accountability; European Central Bank; European Parliament; eurozone crisis; independence; inflation; judicial review; mandate
Disciplines :
Political science, public administration & international relations
European & international law
Author, co-author :
HÖGENAUER, Anna-Lena  ;  University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences (FHSE) > Department of Social Sciences (DSOC) > Political Science
MENDES, Joana ;  University of Luxembourg > Luxembourg Centre for European Law (LCEL) > LCEL Research
External co-authors :
no
Language :
English
Title :
The ECB's Evolving Mandate and High Independence: An Undemocratic Mix
Publication date :
2025
Journal title :
Politics and Governance
eISSN :
2183-2463
Publisher :
Cogitatio, Lisbon, Portugal
Volume :
13
Peer reviewed :
Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi
Available on ORBilu :
since 05 January 2026

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