aircraft; GNSS; GPS; jamming; spoofing; Automatic dependent surveillance broadcasts; Aviation systems; Conflict zones; Global Navigation Satellite Systems; Jamming attacks; Safety and securities; Security challenges; Spoofing; Spoofing attacks; System risk; Computer Networks and Communications
Abstract :
[en] Aviation's dependency on global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) has highlighted the vulnerability of aircraft to jamming and spoofing attacks, which pose significant safety and security challenges. These threats, created and exacerbated by recent geopolitical conflicts, underscore the necessity for monitoring and mitigating GNSS interference to ensure the integrity of aviation systems. This paper examines the impact of GNSS interference on civil and military aviation, focusing on its operational and safety implications. By building a new tool that exploits Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data, we identify hotspots of GNSS jamming and spoofing in conflict zones during 2024 in regions such as the Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and the India-Pakistan border during peak periods. Daily detections peaked at 1,500 flights, declining to about 500 flights by late 2024. Finally, we discuss the applicability of existing countermeasures, such as cryptographic authentication, multi-constellation GNSS usage, and data fusion with inertial systems. While promising, these methods face challenges in widespread adoption due to technical, operational, and regulatory constraints. Our results contribute to understanding the evolving nature of GNSS threats and demonstrate the need for collaborative international efforts to develop resilient aviation navigation systems. By prioritizing GNSS interference monitoring and mitigation, the aviation sector can enhance safety, operational reliability, and preparedness against future threats.
Disciplines :
Aerospace & aeronautics engineering
Author, co-author :
Felux, Michael; School of Engineering, Zurich University of Applied Sciences, Winterthur, Switzerland
Figuet, Benoit; SkAI Data Services, Zurich University of Applied Sciences, Winterthur, Switzerland
LENDERS, Vincent ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > Systems and Network Security Group (SNS) ; Cyber-Defence Campus armasuisse, Thun, Switzerland
Monstein, Raphael; SkAI Data Services, Zurich University of Applied Sciences, Winterthur, Switzerland
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