Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2019 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
J Alberti, ‘O Tell Me the Truth About the Transfer of Preliminary Rulings to the General Court’ (2025) 10 European Papers 333.
See the new Art 23 of the Statute of the CJEU. Requests for a preliminary ruling shall be now notified also to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Central Bank. Where they consider that they have a particular interest in an issue raised by a request for a preliminary ruling, they are entitled to submit statements of case or written observations to the CJ. Furthermore, the new Art 23(5) of the Statute of the CJEU foresees the publication on the CJEU’s website of statements of case or written observations submitted by an interested person pursuant to Art 23 of the Statute after the closing of the proceedings, unless that person raises objections to the publication of its own written submissions.
The 2024 reform also provides for an extension of the filtering mechanism for appeals against decisions of the GC which have been already previously heard by an independent board of appeal of a Union body, office or agency. This mechanism was introduced in 2019, with the entry into force of Art 58a of the Statute of the CJEU and was extended in 2024 to six additional independent boards of appeal. Furthermore, this mechanism also applies to independent boards of appeal established after 1 May 2019 within any other body, office or agency of the Union and to disputes relating to the performance of contracts containing an arbitration clause.
See, for example, JHH Weiler, ‘The Reformation of European Constitutionalism’ (1997) 35 Journal of Common Market Studies 97, 99;
B Vesterdorf, ‘A constitutional court for the EU?’ (2006) 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 607, 607: ‘There is no single accepted definition of what a “constitutional court” is, but everyone would probably agree that, at a minimum, it requires, first, a “constitution” (or any other “supreme law of the land” or Magna Carta) and, second, a court defending and interpreting this basic charter’.
See also A Dashwood and AC Johnston, ‘Synthesis of the Debate’ in A Dashwood and AC Johnston (eds), The Future of the Judicial System of the European Union (Hart Publishing 2001) 55, 62. The latter provided a synthesis of the discussions which, in 1999, resulted in the adoption of the Court’s paper entitled ‘The Future of the Judicial System of the European Union (Proposals and Reflections)’.
See already, at that time with reference to the ECSC, R Schuman, ‘Préface’ in P Reuter (ed), La Communauté Européenne de Charbon et de l’Acier (Pichon et Durand-Auzias 1953), 7. Famously, Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos, EU:C:1963:1, p 12 (‘new legal order of international law’).
See also G Itzcovich, ‘The European Court of Justice as a Constitutional Court. Legal Reasoning in a Comparative Perspective’ (2014) 4 STALS Research Paper 1, 4–11.
Dashwood and Johnston (n 5) 62.
Similarly, already Mertens de Wilmars in 1987:
see Centre d’études internationales et européennes, Le Parlement européen et la Cour de justice des Communautés européenne: table ronde, Strasbourg, 10 avril 1987 (Université R Schuman 1987) 54.
O Due, ‘A Constitutional Court for the European Communities?’ in DM Curtin and DO’Keeffe (eds), Constitutional Adjudication in European Community & National Law: Essays for the Hon. Mr. Justice T. F. O’Higgins (Butterworths 1992) 3, 4.
Ibid.
See, inter alia, GCR Iglesias, ‘Der Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften als Verfassungsgericht’ (1992) 3 EuR 225, 226;
Dashwood and Johnston (n 5) 60;
K Lenaerts, ‘The Rule of Law and the Coherence of the Judicial System of the European Union’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 1625, 1651–1652;
MT Kotzur, ‘Funktionen und funktionelle Zuständigkeit der europäischen Gerichte’ in U Karpenstein, MT Kotzur and JJ Vasel (eds), Handbuch Rechtsschutz in der Europäischen Union (Beck 2024) 49, 62;
A Arnull, ‘A Constitutional Court for Europe?’ (2003–2004) 6 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 1, 2–4;
E Sharpston and G de Baere, ‘The Court of Justice as a Constitutional Adjudicator’ in A Arnull, C Bernard, M Dougan and E Spaventa (eds), A Constitutional Order of States? Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Hart Publishing 2011) 123, 124–125.
Ibid.
See, for example, Lenaerts (n 11) 1651–1652;
J Kokott, ‘Der EuGH auf dem Weg zum Verfassungsgericht’ (2025) 80 JuristenZeitung 278;
Opinion of AG Ćapeta in Joined Cases C-29/22 and C-44/22 KS and KD, EU:C:2023:901, paras 117, 133 and 155;
Opinion of AG Ćapeta in Case C-769/22 Commission v Hungary, EU:C:2025:408, para 215: ‘The Court of Justice is a constitutional court […]’.
As famously referred to in Van Gend & Loos (n 6) p 13;
Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL, EU:C:1964:66, p 593.
See Dashwood and Johnston (n 5) 60.
Ibid.
See also, for example, Iglesias (n 11) 226;
FG Jacobs, ‘Is the Court of Justice of the European Communities a Constitutional Court?’ in DM Curtin and DO’Keeffe (eds), Constitutional Adjudication in European Community & National Law: Essays for the Hon. Mr. Justice T. F. O’Higgins (Butterworths 1992) 25.
Ibid.
M Claes and M de Visser, ‘The Court of Justice as a Federal Constitutional Court: A Comparative Perspective’, in E Cloots, G de Baere and S Sottiaux (eds), Federalism in the European Union (Bloomsbury Publishing 2012) 122.
According to the statistics presented by the Court, requests for a preliminary ruling account for around 62% of the caseload of the CJ, and the six selected areas transferred to the GC encompass approximately 20% of all preliminary references reaching the CJEU. See Court of Justice of the European Union, ‘Annual Report 2024 – Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the Court of Justice’, at curia.europa.eu, 5.
These are: the standard system of value added tax; excise duties; the Customs Code; the tariff classification of goods under the Combined Nomenclature; compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding or of delay or cancellation of transport services; the system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading.
M Bobek, ‘Preliminary rulings before the General Court: What judicial architecture for the European Union?’ (2023) 60 Common Market Law Review 1515, 1517.
See also the Court’s Paper on ‘The Future of the Judicial System of the European Union (Proposals and Reflections)’ printed in Dashwood and Johnston (eds) (n 5) 133.
See also Vesterdorf (n 5) 613;
P Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 269;
U Öberg, ‘A “General” Court in Name Only?’ (2024) 3 Concurrences 1, 4.
Alberti (n 2) 338–340;
Bobek (n 25) 1527.
As of the end of August 2025, 60 preliminary ruling cases have been transmitted to the GC. See the list available on the Court’s website (curia.europa.eu).
Case T-534/24 Gotek, EU:T:2025:682.
Court of Justice of the European Union, ‘Annual Report 2024 – Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the Court of Justice’ (n 21) 31.
Request submitted by the Court of Justice pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 281 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, with a view to amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, at curia.europa.eu, 4–5.
In the meantime, the Court has published a list of examples of the application of Art 50b of the Statute, also indicating the cases in which it considered such an ‘independent question’ to be given:
see Court of Justice of the European Union, ‘Implementation of Article 50b of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (1/10/2024–30/06/2025)’, at curia.europa.eu.
M Bobek, ‘The Future Will Tell. Of Course It Will, But on What Criteria?’ in The 2024 Reform of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EU (EU Law Live 2024) 41, 43: ‘[…] there is simply no dividing line between a “constitutional question” and “mere law” in individual cases’.
See also R Mastroianni, ‘Il trasferimento delle questioni pregiudiziali al Tribunale: una riforma epocale o un salto nel buio?’ (2024) Rivista Quaderni AISDUE 23.
The recitals of the Regulation try to offer some guidelines but, rather than providing clarity, they create further ambiguities. Recital 16 of the Regulation states that questions of jurisdiction or admissibility raised are not to be considered as horizontal and shall thus remain within the competence of the GC. What, however, happens if an issue of jurisdiction or admissibility gives rise to a question of principle, important for ensuring the unity and consistency of EU law? Can this question be considered as falling under Art 50b(2) Statute? See T Tridimas, ‘Sharing Uniformity: A New Era Beckons’ (2024) 1 LCEL Research Paper Series 2, 8;
S Iglesias Sánchez, ‘The 2024 Reform of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EU and the Transformation of the EU Judicial System: Preliminary Rulings before the General Court of the EU’ in A Saiz Arnaiz and J Solanes Mullor (eds), The European Judiciary (Hart Publishing 2025) 97, 103.
See also Tridimas (n 36) 13.
Ibid, 12.
S Iglesias Sánchez, ‘Return of the Réexamen’ in The 2024 Reform of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EU (EU Law Live 2024) 35, 37: ‘The criteria for “retained jurisdiction” outlined in Article 50b of the Statute […] may be traced back to the idea of the “important position” that a rule occupies in EU law.’ Takis Tridimas suggested that ‘independent’ should be understood as ‘separate’, meaning that ‘a reference raises an issue of interpretation of one of the higher ranking norms which goes beyond its mere application in the case in issue’,
see Tridimas (n 36) 11–12.
As has been suggested by Alberti (n 2) 344.
Tridimas (n 36) 13.
Bobek (n 25) 1550.
Art 50b(3) of the Statute of the CJEU;
Art 93a of the RoP of the CJ.
The fact that the ‘guichet unique’ is composed solely of CJ members sparked some controversy:
see, inter alia, Alberti (n 2) 338;
Mastroianni (n 35) 21–23;
R Alonso García, ‘The Persian Jurist in Luxembourg: On the Decentralisation of the Preliminary Ruling Procedure’ in Weekend Edition No 195 (EU Law Live 2024) 9–10.
Art 93a of the RoP of the CJ. The decision of the President and the decision of the Réunion Générale are both not published. For a more detailed analysis of the ‘guichet unique’ see previous contributions in this Special Section: O Porchia, ‘A View from the General Court. The Reform for the Transfer of Competences for Preliminary Rulings to the General Court: Issues Concerning Its Implementation’ (2025) 10 European Papers 391, 395–397;
L Grossio and D Petrić, ‘EU Procedural Law Revisited: The Reformed EU Judicial Architecture between the Statute of the Court of Justice and the Rules of Procedure’ (2025) 10 European Papers 293, 302–307, as well as L Rezki, ‘A View from the Court of Justice. Some Considerations About the Transfer of Competence for Preliminary Rulings to the General Court: The Functioning of the Guichet Unique and a Brief Review After Nine Months of Implementation of the Reform’ (2025) 10 European Papers 877.
Critical in this regard Alberti (n 2) 345, who acknowledges that this novelty could be interpreted as a sign of constitutionalisation but considers ‘verticalisation’ to be a more accurate description of the reform’s defining element.
A Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutional Courts’ in M Rosenfeld and A Sajo (eds), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 816, 817.
Art 256(3), second sentence, TFEU;
Art 54(2) of the Statute of the CJEU. For a more detailed analysis, see D Düsterhaus, ‘Referring Cases Back to the Court of Justice: Faculty or Duty’ in The 2024 Reform of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EU (EU Law Live 2024) 13;
Grossio and Petrić (n 45) 305–306.
Art 256(3), third sentence TFEU;
Arts 62 to 62b of the Statute of the CJEU.
Art 62(2) of the Statute of the CJEU.
Ibid.
Art 62b(2) of the Statute of the CJEU.
See, inter alia, Grossio and Petrić (n 45) 313–316;
Iglesias Sánchez (n 39) 35–38;
Bobek (n 25)
Request submitted by the Court of Justice (n 32) 6;
also Art 256(3), third sentence, TFEU.
See also Iglesias Sánchez (n 39) 36–37;
Grossio and Petrić (n 45) 314–316. As regards the application of the ‘unity and consistency of Union law’ criterion in the context of Art 256(2) TFEU, see S Hummelbrunner, ‘The Unity and Consistency of Union Law: The Core of Review under Article 256(2) and (3) TFEU’ (2018) 73 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 295.
Opinion of AG Wathelet in Case C-417/14 RX-II Livio Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v European Commission, EU:C:2015:593, para 54.
See also, for example, Case C-197/09 RX-II Review
M v EMEA, EU:C:2009:804, paras 60–66;
Case C-334/12 RX-II Review Arango Jaramillo and Others v European Investment Bank, EU:C:2013:134, paras 50–54.
More in detail, see Iglesias Sánchez (n 39) 37.
Ibid.
Ibid; Grossio and Petrić (n 45) 315.
See, for example, Case C-689/13 PFE v Airgest SpA, EU:C:2016:199, para 38.
D Sarmiento, ‘Gaps and “Known Unknowns” in the Transfer of Preliminary References to the General Court’ (2024) 3 Rivista del Contenzioso Europeo 21, 35–36;
Grossio and Petrić (n 45) 315;
Tridimas (n 36) 13: ‘[…] the frame of mind should be towards empowering rather than limiting the GC’.
As has also been stated in the context of the review procedure provided for in Art 256(2), second sentence, TFEU.
See Case C-17/11 RX Review of Judgment T-143/09, Commission v Petrilli, EU:T:2010:531, para 4: ‘[…] the fact that the Court of Justice has not yet ruled on a point of law is, in itself, not sufficient to justify a review pursuant to Article 62 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in so far as it is now solely for the Civil Service Tribunal and the General Court of the European Union to develop the case-law in matters relating to the civil service, since the Court of Justice has jurisdiction only to prevent the decisions of the General Court affecting the unity or consistency of European Union law’.
Bobek (n 25) 1527;
Bobek (n 34) 43.
See also Sarmiento (n 61) 15. The GC will, in principle, be free to depart from the case law of the CJ in the ‘specific areas’.
As has been argued, for example, by Mastroianni (n 35) 27.
For a more detailed analysis of the GC’s transformation, see Porchia (n 45) 395–397;
Öberg (n 26);
G Hesse, ‘Die Übertragung von bestimmten Kategorien an Vorabentscheidungsverfahren auf das Gericht der EU’ (2025) EuR Beiheft 189, 193–199. That the GC is undergoing a process of specialisation is, however, not undisputed:
see Alberti (n 2) 335–338. He argued, inter alia, that the transfer of preliminary rulings to the GC broadens the subject areas and increases the judicial procedures dealt with by the GC. Thus, the argument of the progressive specialisation would not be convincing. However, it must be recalled that the GC’s preliminary ruling jurisdiction is limited to six specific, highly technical areas, assigned to two chambers specialised on dealing with preliminary rulings.
And specified in Arts 25(1) and 26(1) of the RoP of the GC.
Court of Justice of the European Union, Formation of Chambers and assignment of Judges to Chambers (C/2024/6456).
Request submitted by the Court of Justice (n 32) 7;
Bobek (n 34) 42.
Similarly, Request submitted by the Court of Justice (n 32) 7.
R Conti, ‘C’era una volta il rinvio pregiudiziale. Alla ricerca della fiducia – un po’ perduta – fra giudici nazionali ed europei’ in B Nascimbene and G Greco (eds), La riforma dello Statuto della Corte di giustizia (2024) Eurojus 112;
Michal Bobek considers the risk of diminished trust in the lower EU court to be far-fetched. However, he argues that national courts may question the sense of submitting preliminary references to the GC, as in these areas a substantial body of case law exists preventing the potential risk of inconsistencies or divergences in the case law (Bobek (n 25) 1536).
Also D Petrić, ‘The Preliminary Ruling Procedure 2.0’ (2023) 8 European Papers 25, 39;
Sarmiento (n 61) 15–16;
Hesse (n 66) 197.
Hesse (n 66) 197.
D Sarmiento, ‘On the Road to a Constitutional Court of the European Union: The Court of Justice After the Transfer of the Preliminary Reference Jurisdiction to the General Court’ (2023) 19 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy VII, VII–XVII;
S Iglesias Sánchez, ‘Shared Jurisdiction of EU Courts Over Preliminary Rulings: One procedure. Two Courts. One Interpretation?’ (2024) 3-4 REALaw 79, 84;
Petrić (n 72) 42;
S Iglesias Sànchez and D Sarmiento, ‘Insight: A New Model for the EU Judiciary: Decentralising Preliminary Rulings as a Paradoxical Move Towards the Constitutionalisation of the Court of Justice’ (EU Law Live, 8 April 2024);
MF Orzan, ‘Un’ulteriore applicazione della “legge di Hooke”? Riflessioni a margine dell’entrata in vigore della recente riforma dello Statuto della Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea’ (2024) Rivista del contenzioso europeo 30, 74;
C Tovo, ‘Le nuove regole processuali in materia pregiudiziale e le loro implicazioni istituzionali per la Corte di giustizia: verso un’ulteriore costituzionalizzazione?’ in B Nascimbene and G Greco (eds) (n 71);
P Dermine, ‘What the European Court of Justice Is For – Making Sense of the ECJ’s Procedural and Organisational Law’ (2023) 19 European Constitutional Law Review 768, 784–785.
Alberti (n 2) 340–344;
Bobek (n 34) 43.
Alberti (n 2).
Case C-617/10 Akerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105. The Court itself referred to the Akerberg Fransson case in its 2017 Report, highlighting the risk that requests for a preliminary ruling, although falling within technical areas, may nonetheless raise questions concerning the interpretation of fundamental provisions of EU law.
See Court of Justice of the European Union, ‘Report submitted pursuant to Article 3(2) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2422 of the European Parliament and of the
Council amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union’, at curia.europa.eu, 6.
Petrić (n 72) 33;
Sarmiento (n 74) X;
JJ Vasel, ‘Die Organisationsstruktur der Europäischen Gerichtsbarkeit’ in U Karpenstein, MT Kotzur and JJ Vasel (eds) (n 11) 24, 32;
Bobek (n 34) 43.
See, inter alia, Iglesias Sánchez (n 36) 109;
Iglesias Sánchez and Sarmiento (n 74).
Iglesias Sánchez (n 36) 109.
Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-17/00 François De Coster v Collège des bourgmestre et échevins de Watermael-Boitsfort, EU:C:2001:366, para 74.
Report submitted pursuant to Article 3(2) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2422 (n 77) 6–7;
Court of Justice of the European Union, ‘Report provided for under Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2422’, at curia.europa.eu, 8–9.
See also Lenaerts (n 9) 1656.
Request submitted by the Court of Justice (n 32) 3.
See also Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2019 (n 1) recital 4.
The year in which the Court issued its first ruling: Case 1/54 France v High Authority (ECR 1954).
M Lagrange, ‘La Cour de justice de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier’ (1954) 80 Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et à l'étranger 417, 434–435.
See A Cohen, ‘“Ten Majestic Figures in Long Amaranth Robes”: The Formation of the Court of Justice of the European Communities’ (2010) 60 Revue française de science politique 23, 37.
Centre d’études internationales et européennes (n 5) 55.
AM Donner, ‘The Constitutional Powers of the Court of Justice of the European Communities’ (1974) 11 Common Market Law Review 127, who however adopted a more critical approach.
Due (n 9) 3–10.
Iglesias (n 11) 225–246.
Jacobs (n 17) 25–31.
Vesterdorf (n 5) 607–616. He acknowledged that the CJ already performs the tasks of a constitutional court but emphasised that its competences are broader than those of a pure constitutional court. He therefore argued that the CJ resembles more a supreme court than a specialised constitutional court.
Printed in Dashwood and Johnston (eds) (n 5) 113–143.
Ibid, 59.
Ibid, 60.
Vesterdorf (n 5) 614.
Most famously Costa v ENEL (n 14) p 592–593.
See, for example, Case C-189/18 Glencore Agriculture Hungary, EU:C:2019:861, para 31;
Case C-448/19 Subdelegación del Gobierno en Guadalajara, EU:C:2020:467, para 17;
Case C-463/19 Syndicat CFTC du personnel de la Caisse primaire d’assurance maladie de la Moselle, EU:C:2020:932, paras 29–30;
Case C-817/19 Ligue des droits humains, EU:C:2022:491 2022, para 240.
See GF Mancini and DT Keeling, ‘From CILFIT to ERT: the Constitutional Challenge facing the European Court’ (1991) 11 Yearbook of European Law 1, 9. It must, however, be stressed that the preliminary reference procedure is highly dependent on fruitful cooperation between national courts and the CJEU.
Ibid.
See also Opinion of AG Ćapeta in Case C-769/22 European Commission v Hungary, EU:C:2025:408, para 71.
Opinion of AG Bobek in Case C-561/19 Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA, EU:C:2021:291, paras 134, 149.
Case C-561/19 Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA, EU:C:2021:799, para 51.
Case C-144/23 Kubera v Republika Slovenija, ECLI:EU:C:2024:881. The CJ clarified that this obligation also applies within national ‘filtering’ mechanisms, such as proceedings for granting leave to appeal before national supreme courts.
See T Hilpold, ‘Op-Ed: Consorzio Italian Management Reloaded: Court of Justice further Strengthens the Preliminary Reference Procedure in the Case Kubera (C-144/23)’ (EU Law Live 2024);
T Hilpold, ‘Op-Ed: Vigilantibus non Dormientibus Iura Succurrunt: Are National Filtering Mechanisms for the Access to the Preliminary Ruling Procedure Admissible? AG Opinion in Case C-144/23 Kubera’ (EU Law Live 2024).
See also Iglesias Sánchez (n 36) 110–111.
This could have far-reaching consequences, as in recent years high courts have been those primarily referring cases to the CJEU:
see, for example, T Pavone and RD Kelemen, ‘The Evolving Judicial Politics of European Integration: The European Court of Justice and national courts revisited’ (2019) 25 European Law Journal 352;
A Dyevre, M Glavina and A Atanasova, ‘Who refers most? Institutional incentives and judicial participation in the preliminary ruling system’ (2020) 27 Journal of European Public Policy 912.
Iglesias Sánchez (n 36) 110–111.
Similarly, Tridimas (n 36) 23;
T Tridimas, ‘Breaking with Tradition: Preliminary Reference Reform and the New Judicial Architecture’ in The 2024 Reform of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EU (EU Law Live 2024) 5, 6.
Alberti (n 2) 342–344.
Ibid; Bobek (n 25) 1529;
Alonso García (n 44) 8;
C Amalfitano, ‘The Future of Preliminary Rulings in the EU Judicial System’ in Weekend Edition No 133 (EU Law Live 2023) 1, 7.
Alberti (n 2) 342–344. For example, Marc van der Woude argued for a conceptual model according to which ‘the Court of Justice would increasingly act as the Union’s constitutional court and transfer lesser tasks and responsibilities to the General Court. This court would become the Union’s Council of State controlling the conduct of its institutions, when they act directly or indirectly in close cooperation with national administrations’.
See M van der Woude, ‘The Place of the General Court in the Institutional Framework of the Union’ in Weekend Edition No 81 (EU Law Live 2021) 20, 26
Bobek (n 25) 1529.
Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2422 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. On the 2015 reform,
see, for example, D Sarmiento, ‘The Reform of the General Court: An Exercise in Minimalist (but Radical) Institutional Reform’ (2017) 19 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 236;
A Alemanno and L Pech, ‘Thinking justice outside the docket: A critical assessment of the reform of the EU’s court system’ (2017) 54 Common Market Law Review 129.
Iglesias Sánchez (n 74) 78–79;
Bobek (n 25) 1515;
Sarmiento (n 74) X, XIII. However, as mentioned above, the possibility of transferring competences on preliminary references to the GC was already provided for in the Treaty of Nice.
Draft amendments to the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and to Annex I thereto of 7 April 2011, Interinstitutional file: 2011/0901 (COD), 10.
Report submitted pursuant to Article 3(2) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2422 (n 77) 4–8.
Report provided for under Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2422 (n 82) 54.
Report by the Working Party on the Future of the European Communities’ Court System (January 2000), printed in Dashwood and Johnston (n 5) 147.
See Bobek (n 25) 1529–1530, in particular fn 41;
Alberti (n 2) fn 39.
And, of course, as mentioned before, the Treaties, see Art 19(1) TEU.
Report by the Working Party on the Future of the European Communities’ Court System (January 2000), printed in Dashwood and Johnston (n 5) 186.
Ibid, 161.
Ibid.
See already Report by the Working Party on the Future of the European Communities’ Court System (January 2000), printed in Dashwood and Johnston (n 5) 186.
Judge at the Court of Justice of the European Communities from 1967 to 1984, and President of the Court from 1980 to 1984.
Centre d’études internationales et européennes (n 5) 66.
